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The Right to Vote Under Local Law
Joshua A. Douglas*
ABSTRACT
A complete analysis of the right to vote requires at least three levels of
inquiry: the U.S. Constitution and federal law, state constitutions and state
law, and local laws that confer voting rights for municipal elections. But most
voting rights scholarship focuses on only federal or state law and omits any
discussion of the third category. This Article—the first to explore in depth the
local right to vote—completes the trilogy. Cities and towns across the country
are expanding the right to vote in municipal elections to include sixteen- and
seventeen-year-olds, noncitizens, nonresident property owners, and others.
Berkeley, California, for example, recently lowered the voting age to sixteen
for its school board elections.
This Article highlights these developments, encourages local voter expan-
sions, and provides a test for courts to use when facing a judicial challenge to
these rules. If states are “laboratories of democracy” that may experiment with
social policies, then municipalities are “test tubes of democracy” that also can
try out novel democratic rules, such as broadening the right to vote, on a
smaller scale. Historically, some voter expansions, such as the elimination of
property requirements and the women’s suffrage movement, enjoyed early
successes at the local level. Local voting rights, then, can serve as catalysts for
broader reforms as they “trickle across” to other municipalities and “trickle
up” to states and Congress.
As a matter of policy, local jurisdictions should enfranchise anyone who
has a sufficient stake in local affairs and has the proper incentives and ability
to make informed choices about who should lead them—which might include
sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds, noncitizens (who are lawful permanent re-
sidents), nonresident property owners, felons, or others. States with barriers to
local voting laws, through substantive voter qualifications or lack of “home
rule” authorization to localities, should amend their state constitutional provi-
sions or statutes. (An Appendix presents a fifty-state chart on the possibility in
each state of enacting local voting laws.) Courts should defer to local laws that
expand the right to vote as a means of local democracy, but should not defer
to restrictions on the right to vote because limiting who may vote harms the
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ideal of democratic inclusion. Robust protection of the right to vote depends
on local voting rules as an early component of the reform effort. Enhanced
local voting rights will produce a more representative local government, create
a habit of voting for various groups—such as younger voters—that will ame-
liorate low turnout, and strengthen local democracy.
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INTRODUCTION
In an episode of the television show The West Wing, middle
school students from a fictional children’s advocacy group called “Fu-
ture Leaders for Democracy” try to convince White House Communi-
cations Director Toby Ziegler that children should enjoy the right to
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vote.1 After largely agreeing with their various substantive arguments
for children’s suffrage, Toby strategizes, “Well, I’d go for lowering the
age in increments and I wouldn’t start at the federal level.”2
The real-life push for expanded suffrage has tracked Toby’s ad-
vice. Throughout the country, local jurisdictions are debating whether
to expand the right to vote in local elections for various constituen-
cies, such as younger Americans, noncitizens, and nonresident prop-
erty owners. For instance, in November 2016, Berkeley, California,
decided to lower the voting age to sixteen for its school board elec-
tions and San Francisco voters narrowly rejected a referendum to re-
duce the voting age to sixteen for all of its city elections.3 Some small
jurisdictions have already lowered the voting age or otherwise ex-
panded the right to vote in local elections for other interested groups,
such as noncitizens or nonresident property owners.4 These local vot-
ing rules are significant in their own right, and they also may fore-
shadow expanded suffrage in state or federal elections.
Despite this robust activity on the local level, however, most elec-
tion law scholarship has analyzed the right to vote primarily from the
perspective of the U.S. Constitution.5 More recently, in the wake of
limited protection of voting rights from federal courts, scholars and
litigants have considered the power of state constitutions.6 Yet elec-
1 The West Wing: A Good Day (NBC television broadcast Mar. 2, 2005).
2 Id.
3 See Aleah Jennings-Newhouse et al., City Measures T1, U1, V1, W1, X1, Y1, Z1, AA
Pass; Measures BB, CC, DD Fail, DAILY CALIFORNIAN (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.dailycal.org/
2016/11/09/city-measures-t1-u1-v1-w1-x1-y1-z1-aa-pass-measures-bb-cc-dd-fail/; Measure Y1—
City of Berkeley, ALAMEDA COUNTY, CA, http://www.acgov.org/rov_app/current_election/
nofrace.jsp?e=230&f=124124.htm (last updated Nov. 18, 2016, 8:11 PM); November 8, 2016 Offi-
cial Election Results: Local Measure F—Youth Voting in Local Elections, CITY & COUNTY S.F.:
DEP’T ELECTIONS, http://www.sfelections.org/results/20161108/#a_english_42 (last updated Dec.
6, 2016, 3:59 PM); see also Emily Green, Supervisors OK Ballot Measure to Lower SF Voting Age
to 16, SFGATE (MAY 10, 2016, 9:02 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Supervisors-OK-
ballot-measure-to-lower-SF-voting-7458077.php.
4 See infra Part II.
5 See Joshua A. Douglas, State Judges and the Right to Vote, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 11 (2016)
(noting that “virtually all recent scholarship on the right to vote has focused either on U.S.
Supreme Court cases or has isolated a single state’s jurisprudence”); Adam Winkler, Voters’
Rights and Parties’ Wrongs: Early Political Party Regulation in the State Courts, 1886–1915, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 873, 873 (2000) (“The focus [of election law scholarship] has been on federal
law and U.S. Supreme Court decisions, even though each of the fifty states has its own set of
detailed election regulations.”).
6 See, e.g., Martin v. Kohls, 444 S.W.3d 844, 852 (Ark. 2014) (invalidating voter identifica-
tion law under the state constitution). See generally Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under
State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. 89 (2014) (advocating for the use of state constitutions to
provide greater protection to the right to vote); James A. Gardner, Liberty, Community and the
Constitutional Structure of Political Influence: A Reconsideration of the Right to Vote, 145 U. PA.
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tion law scholarship has not focused on what is happening on the
ground in cities and towns across the country.7 This Article fills that
void. It details local voting rights laws, providing a fuller examination
of the right to vote in America. A complete picture of the right to vote
requires at least three levels of inquiry: the U.S. Constitution and fed-
eral law, state constitutions and state law, and local laws that confer
voting rights for municipal elections.8 This Article completes the
trilogy.9
Local elections—for mayor, city council, school board, and the
like—are extremely important and meaningful.10 People are closest to
their local elected officials. Many voters know their city council mem-
ber personally; few people are acquaintances with their member of
Congress, the Governor, or the President. When individuals have a
problem or need something done, they often call their local represen-
tative. The outcome of a local race can have a significant impact on
the scope of local policy, which often has a much greater effect on
L. REV. 893 (1997) (considering the ability of state constitutions to police partisan gerrymander-
ing); see also generally Michael T. Morley, Rethinking the Right to Vote Under State Constitu-
tions, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 189 (2014) (arguing against Douglas’s proposition that state
constitutions provide more protection for local voters than the U.S. Constitution).
7 Indeed, my own scholarship has followed this track: I first wrote an article discussing the
federal right to vote before more recently exploring what state constitutions say about the sub-
ject. See generally Joshua A. Douglas, Is the Right to Vote Really Fundamental?, 18 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 143 (2008); Douglas, supra note 6. R
8 Various procedural rules on the voting process also can affect who may vote. This Arti-
cle, however, focuses on substantive qualification provisions in local laws and does not discuss
separate rules involving election administration.
9 International norms on the right to vote also may implicate how the United States
should treat this fundamental right. See, e.g., Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation
in International Law, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 539, 541 (1992); Alexander Kirshner, Democracy Coa-
lition Project, The International Status of the Right to Vote, http://archive.fairvote.org/media/rtv/
kirshner.pdf (last visited May 27, 2017).
10 See infra Part I. Importantly, this article analyzes the qualification rules for general pur-
pose local elections (which include governmental units that can tax or regulate individuals’ pri-
mary behavior) and does not consider in detail special-purpose or limited-purpose elections,
such as for water districts or the like. The Supreme Court has generally exempted special-pur-
pose districts (besides school boards) from traditional election law rules such as the one person,
one vote requirement. See Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 370 (1981); see also Richard Briffault,
Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local Governments, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 339,
421 (1993) (“These local arrangements were, in effect, depoliticized, and their voting and appor-
tionment rules were held to have no implications for local popular representation in local gov-
ernance.”); Ellen D. Katz, Race and the Right to Vote After Rice v. Cayetano, 99 MICH. L. REV.
491, 508 (2000) (“The Court has applied deferential rational basis review to electoral restrictions
in special-purpose districts in past cases only because it has not viewed such restrictions to impli-
cate a fundamental right to vote.”). But see Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 522 (2000) (sug-
gesting that the Fifteenth Amendment’s prohibition against racial classifications in voting would
apply to a special-purpose election).
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individuals than statewide or national laws. Participatory democracy
and political community flourishes at the local level. In sum, there is a
lot at stake in local elections.
Discerning who is part of the local electorate, then, is vital for
understanding the operation of local democracy. Yet the electorate in
many places differs from the population eligible to vote for state or
national races. Municipalities have expanded the right to vote in local
elections to sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds, noncitizens, and nonres-
ident property owners.11 Local laws also have the potential to en-
franchise other groups who cannot vote in state or national elections,
such as felons.12
On a broader scale, expansions of the right to vote for municipal
elections might lead to voting rights reforms at the statewide or na-
tional level. Some voting rights developments, such as the elimination
of property requirements and the women’s suffrage movement, saw
early successes for local elections before enjoying more widespread
adoption.13 If states are “laboratories of democracy” that can try out
various reforms, then municipalities can be “test tubes of democracy”
that may experiment with different voting rules.14 These expansions
can then “trickle across” to other municipalities, and eventually
“trickle up” to states or Congress, which will more likely adopt re-
forms that are working well at the local level. Thus, it is important to
highlight the first movers on expanded voting rights, as they may serve
as catalysts for more widespread changes. Robust protection of the
right to vote depends on local voting rules as an early component of
the reform effort.
This Article, the first to explore in depth the local right to vote,
proceeds in three Parts. Part I provides historical context, showing
that in the late 1700s and early 1800s, voter eligibility rules for local
elections were sometimes more expansive than for state or national
elections. Specifically, states and localities eliminated property re-
quirements for voting and allowed women to vote in school board or
11 See infra Part II.
12 See, e.g., TAKOMA PARK, MD., MUN. CODE art. VI, § 601 (2016), http://www.codepub
lishing.com/MD/TakomaPark/#!/takomaparkch/TakomaParkCH06.html#06 (disenfranchising
felons who are currently in prison, but not those who have completed their sentence); Lindsay
A. Powers, Takoma Park Grants 16-Year-Olds Right to Vote, WASH. POST (May 14, 2013), https:/
/www.washingtonpost.com/local/takoma-park-grants-16-year-olds-right-to-vote/2013/05/14/b27c
52c4-bccd-11e2-89c9-3be8095fe767_story.html (noting that Takoma Park extended the right to
vote to felons who have completed their sentence).
13 See infra Part I.
14 See infra Section III.B.
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city elections well before these rules applied to state or national elec-
tions. These laws were harbingers of the larger movement for ex-
panded voting rights.
Part II then analyzes the current debate on voting rights in cities
and towns across the country. Various jurisdictions have enacted ordi-
nances that expand the electorate for local elections. Municipalities
have lowered the voting age to sixteen, enfranchised noncitizens, and
added nonresident property owners to the voter rolls. Other larger
jurisdictions are in the midst of debates about whether to expand the
electorate for their own elections.
Part III explores both the policy and law behind local laws en-
franchising new groups. Section III.A makes a normative argument in
favor of expanding the franchise as a means of enhancing democratic
representation and legitimacy. Section III.B argues that, as a policy
matter, local jurisdictions are well suited to engage in this voter ex-
pansion. Municipalities can be “test tubes of democracy,” experi-
menting with different electoral rules. Although each jurisdiction
should decide for itself who should comprise its own local electorate,
as a guiding principle local jurisdictions should enfranchise anyone
who has a sufficient stake in local affairs and has the proper incentives
and ability to make informed choices about who should lead them.
Section III.C explains how to navigate the potential legal hurdles
that local voting rules may face. There are no significant U.S. constitu-
tional issues with expanding the right to vote in local elections, but
some state constitutions or state laws may preclude differing local
laws unless there is a change to the statewide rules. For instance, some
states may set the substantive qualifications of voters that must apply
to all elections. In other states, municipalities may not have the power
of “home rule,” or local control. The policy arguments in favor of lo-
cal democracy and local experimentation should lead these states to
reform their state constitutions or state legislation by either eliminat-
ing the uniform voter qualification requirements or granting home
rule for local elections. An Appendix presents a chart of all fifty states
(and D.C.) that lists which states have these potential hurdles.
Stemming from these state-level constitutional or legislative lim-
its, a local voting rule might face judicial review. Section III.C pro-
vides a workable test for judges to use when considering these
challenges: courts should defer to local rules expanding the right to
vote as a means of local democracy but should not defer to municipal
laws that restrict the franchise. Finally, Section III.D concludes by dis-
cussing the potential logistical problems in administering an election
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with an expanded electorate for some races on the ballot but not
others. Voting technology can mitigate these implementation issues.
This Article completes the picture of what it means to enjoy the
right to vote in America. The right to vote is a constitutional right
inherent in the U.S. Constitution and all state constitutions. But it is
also a locally conferred right, at least in some cities and towns. This
expansion of voting rights at the local level will constitute a significant
part of the debate on the right to vote for years to come.
I. LOCALISM AS A CATALYST FOR BROADER CHANGE IN VOTING
RIGHTS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Local laws can serve as a springboard to broader reform nation-
wide, particularly in the expansion of the franchise. History has shown
that municipal voting rules provided significant assistance to at least
some suffrage movements. Although local election administrators
have been complicit in disenfranchising various groups (such as mi-
nority voters) through the application of onerous registration laws,
poll taxes, literacy tests, or other means,15 voting rules for local elec-
tions have also been more expansive at times.
Historically, most state and local laws were coterminous, owing to
the theory of “Dillon’s rule” (named after Judge John Dillon), which
held that “state power over municipalities was ‘supreme and transcen-
dent,’ [and] that municipalities had no ‘inherent right of local self-gov-
ernment which is beyond legislative control.’”16 Yet some states and
municipalities were early movers in enacting local-specific rules for
voting.17 “Although never widespread, distinctive municipal franchise
regulations were adopted in Tulsa, Kansas City, Deer Park, Maryland,
and Oklahoma City, among other places, and they continued to sur-
face throughout the twentieth century.”18
In particular, the debates regarding both the abolition of property
requirements for voting and the women’s suffrage movement initially
15 See Nina Perales et al., Voting Rights in Texas: 1982–2006, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC.
JUST. 713, 714, 721 (2008) (highlighting examples of local officials wrongly disenfranchising vot-
ers in Texas). See generally ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HIS-
TORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 111–112 (2000) (discussing various methods of
disenfranchisement by local officials).
16 KEYSSAR, supra note 15, at 167; see Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 R
(1907) (“Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State, created as convenient
agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to
them.”); see also infra Section III.C.
17 KEYSSAR, supra note 15, at 168. R
18 Id.
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involved laws for local elections. The push for expanding the franchise
for local elections likely had an effect on the subsequent reform ef-
forts at the statewide and national level. This fact does not, of course,
diminish the significance of the debates statewide and nationally, but
it does add another layer to our understanding of the history of voting
rights. Local laws can serve as a catalyst for further reforms. The his-
tory of property qualifications and women’s suffrage thus sheds light
on the ongoing efforts to change municipal laws to expand the
franchise, such as for young people, noncitizens, and nonresident
property owners.19
A. Property Requirements
At the Founding, most states restricted voting only to property
owners.20 As historian Alexander Keyssar recounts, “The lynchpin of
both colonial and British suffrage regulations was the restriction of
voting to adult men who owned property.”21 Yet states began to relax
these property requirements throughout the first few decades of the
country’s history, and by the end of the 1850s property requirements
remained only for “foreign-born residents of Rhode Island and . . .
African Americans in New York.”22 Professor Keyssar points to three
main reasons for the elimination of property ownership requirements
for voting: “widespread and significant changes in the social structure
and social composition of the nation’s population; the appearance or
expansion of conditions under which the material interests of the en-
franchised could be served by broadening the franchise; and the for-
mation of broadly based political parties that competed systematically
for votes.”23 In essence, the changing demographics and geopolitical
landscape of the nation caused several localities to remove property
requirements for voting.
19 See infra Part II.
20 See KEYSSAR, supra note 15, at 5; see, e.g., An Act Concerning Election of Members of R
General Assembly (1785), reprinted in A COLLECTION OF ALL SUCH ACTS OF THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, OF A PUBLIC AND PERMANENT NATURE, AS ARE NOW IN FORCE 19
(Richmond, Samuel Pleasants & Henry Pace 1803).
21 KEYSSAR, supra note 15, at 5. R
22 Of the Rights and Qualifications of Voters, reprinted in THE REVISED STATUTES OF THE
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS 68 (Sayles, Miller & Simons 1857);
An Act Respecting Elections Other Than for Militia and Town Officers, reprinted in LAWS OF
THE STATE OF NEW-YORK, PASSED AT THE SIXTY-FIFTH SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, BEGUN
AND HELD IN THE CITY OF ALBANY 109 (Thurlow Weed 1842); KEYSSAR, supra note 15, at 29; R
see also KIRK H. PORTER, A HISTORY OF SUFFRAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 110–11 (1918).
23 KEYSSAR, supra note 15, at 34. R
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Yet even during this Founding period several municipalities did
not have property requirements, despite state laws to the contrary:
The most common manner in which municipal voting
rights differed from the state suffrage was in the configura-
tion of property restrictions: increasingly, urban residents
who did not own real property could vote if they met either a
personal property or a taxpaying requirement. The principles
of state law were, in effect, adapted to urban conditions. In
some locales, however, the differences were more substan-
tial. Nine of the cities chartered during the revolution
granted the franchise to nearly all adult males; and Massa-
chusetts, in the 1780s, passed a series of laws that gave the
right to vote in town meetings to all men who could meet a
minimal taxpaying requirement.24
As Professor Keyssar concludes, “On the whole, municipal voting
rights tended to broaden more rapidly than did the right to vote in
state elections, probably because of pressure from propertyless urban
citizens.”25
This discussion should not diminish the fact that, throughout the
nineteenth century, some local voting rules were more restrictive than
their state counterparts.26 For instance, most former Confederate
states adopted property requirements (as well as other methods of
voter suppression such as poll taxes) for municipal voters after Recon-
struction as a way to disenfranchise newly freed slaves.27 Yet earlier in
the 1800s, the push and pull between state and local laws sometimes
led state legislatures and municipalities to pass more expansive voting
rules for local elections.28
Although there may be little hard evidence that municipal-spe-
cific rules served as the actual catalyst for statewide or national
changes, it is possible that they had an appreciable influence. Several
local laws decoupling property ownership and voting were in place
well before states began relaxing their own property requirements for
voting.29 Moreover, the expansion of voting rights occurred in large
24 Id. at 20–21.
25 Id. at 21; see also JON C. TEAFORD, THE MUNICIPAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICA: ORI-
GINS OF MODERN URBAN GOVERNMENT: 1650–1825, at 66–67 (1975).
26 See KEYSSAR, supra note 15, at 30–31. R
27 See WILLIAM GILLETTE, RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION: 1869–1879, at 40–42
(1979).
28 See KEYSSAR, supra note 15, at 31. R
29 See id. at 20–21. It took until 1969 for the U.S. Supreme Court to outlaw property quali-
fications for local elections, well after many of these local jurisdictions acted themselves to ex-
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part due to the advocacy of the increasing population of propertyless
men in urban areas who contributed to the economic and social life of
the cities.30
The key takeaway is that early rules removing property require-
ments for voting applied to local elections before becoming more
widespread for state and national elections. This historical data point
in the evolution of voting rights demonstrates the importance of local
laws on the right to vote.
B. Women’s Suffrage
Women earned the right to vote in various local elections, partic-
ularly for school boards, well before the Nineteenth Amendment en-
franchised women nationwide for all elections in 1920. These early
successes for local elections likely helped the nationwide reform ef-
fort. Although many of these examples entailed statewide expansions
of voting rights for local elections, and not municipal-specific laws,
they still demonstrate the greater societal comfort in broadening the
electorate for local races before doing so for statewide or federal elec-
tions. That is, the provision of voting rights for local elections fore-
shadowed greater expansions of voting rights nationally.
As early as 1838, Kentucky women could vote in school board
elections.31 Similarly, as of 1859, Kansas’s constitution allowed women
to vote for school board.32 The theory behind permitting women to
vote in these elections was that children’s education was a “maternal”
issue.33 In 1869, Wyoming became the first territory to allow women to
vote in all elections, making it the first state to grant women’s suffrage
when it entered the Union in 1890.34 In 1887, Kansas gave women the
right to vote in municipal elections.35 Women’s suffrage in all elections
pand the franchise. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 632–33 (1969);
Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969).
30 See KEYSSAR, supra note 15, at 35. R
31 Id. at 175.
32 Eunice Chwenyen Peters, There’s No Place Like Home, J. KAN. B. ASS’N, Feb. 2011, at
14, 14.
33 See J. Morgan Kousser, Voting Rights, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN POLITI-
CAL HISTORY (Oxford Univ. Press forthcoming) (on file with author).
34 Sandra Day O’Connor, The History of the Women’s Suffrage Movement, 49 VAND. L.
REV. 657, 662–63 (1996). New Jersey’s constitution of 1776 and a state statute of 1790 actually
included women as qualified voters, but the state then repealed the right to vote for women in
1807. KEYSSAR, supra note 15, at 54. Justice O’Connor pointed to the Wyoming example as a R
benefit of federalism, as early state adoption of women’s suffrage eventually culminated in the
Nineteenth Amendment. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788 (1982) (O’Connor, J., con-
curring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
35 Peters, supra note 32, at 14. R
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in Kansas followed suit in 1912, eight years before the ratification of
the Nineteenth Amendment.36
Courts generally upheld these early local expansions of the right
to vote.37 For instance, plaintiffs challenged an East Cleveland, Ohio,
charter that granted women the right to vote in city elections.38 The
state constitution conferred voting rights only to “[e]very white male
citizen.”39 In 1917—before the ratification of the Nineteenth Amend-
ment—the Ohio Supreme Court held that the constitutional rule ap-
plied only to elections for offices created by the state constitution, not
to local elections.40 Municipalities could expand the right to vote for
their local elections beyond what the state constitution conferred.41
The court cited an 1889 case from the Michigan Supreme Court that
affirmed the City of Flint’s decision to allow women to vote in school
board elections.42 Similarly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held in
1887 that a state rule allowing women to vote in “any election pertain-
ing to school matters” applied broadly to any election of “officials
whose actions had a direct or indirect affect [sic] on the schools.”43
The Supreme Court of Illinois ruled the same way in 1893,44 as did the
Supreme Court of North Dakota in 1918.45
But not all courts were in agreement. The Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court, in an advisory opinion in 1894, found that re-
quiring the “people” of the state to approve a law granting women the
right to vote in local elections violated the state constitution.46 In a
separate dissenting statement, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes ex-
plained that he found “nothing which forbids the legislature to estab-
lish a local option upon this point.”47 In 1917, the Supreme Court of
36 Id.
37 See Current Decisions, Constitutional Law—Qualifications of Voters—Woman Suffrage
in City Elections, 27 YALE L.J. 421, 421 (1918).
38 See State ex rel. Taylor v. French, 117 N.E. 173 (Ohio 1917).
39 Id. at 174 (quoting OHIO CONST. art. V, § 1).
40 See id. at 176.
41 See id.
42 Belles v. Burr, 43 N.W. 24, 27 (Mich. 1889) (noting that “the qualifications of voters for
school officers, or upon questions arising at school meetings, have never been identical with
those of electors, as defined in the constitution”).
43 Joseph A. Ranney, Wisconsin Law in the Age of Institutions: Chief Justices Winslow and
Rosenberry, WIS. LAW., Feb. 1995, at 22, 23.
44 Plummer v. Yost, 33 N.E. 191, 194 (Ill. 1893).
45 Spatgen v. O’Neil, 169 N.W. 491, 494 (N.D. 1918) (“We are satisfied that the Legisla-
ture, in the exercise of its control over minor municipalities, may authorize women to participate
in the selection of local officers whose election is not provided for in the Constitution.”).
46 In re Mun. Suffrage to Women, 36 N.E. 488, 490 (Mass. 1894).
47 Id. at 492 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Indiana invalidated a state law enfranchising women in local elec-
tions.48 Underlying these decisions, of course, was the reality that
Massachusetts and Indiana were debating voting rights for women in
local elections well before the ratification of the Nineteenth Amend-
ment granted the right to vote to women for all elections. Allowing
women to vote in local elections initially was more acceptable than
enfranchising them outright.
These examples show that women could vote in various munici-
pal elections prior to the Nineteenth Amendment, whether through
local rules or statewide grants. Although the women’s suffrage move-
ment was initially unsuccessful at the federal and statewide level, sev-
eral “partial” expansions of suffrage for women existed for local
elections, such as for school boards.49 As Professor Keyssar explains:
There were . . . a significant number of locales—states,
counties, and municipalities—where partial suffrage was
adopted, permitting women to vote in municipal elections,
on liquor licensing matters, or for local school boards and on
issues affecting education. This unique, even anomalous de-
velopment—enabling women to vote in certain elections but
not in others—was made possible by the complex architec-
ture of voting laws. In most states, the suffrage requirements
for “nonconstitutional” elections did not have to be identical
to those for offices named in state constitutions; they also
could be altered by legislation rather than the cumbersome
and difficult process of constitutional amendment.50
Indeed, by 1890, over twenty states had enacted laws granting
women the right to vote in school elections.51 These rules largely came
about through state legislation, passed after voters rejected similar
referenda in some states, showing that the legislatures “appeared to
be more progressive than the voters.”52 The pro-suffrage activists con-
sidered this success “a stepping-stone, an entering wedge for broader
electoral participation.”53 By contrast, some legislators supported
48 Bd. of Election Comm’rs v. Knight, 117 N.E. 565, 571 (Ind. 1917).
49 KEYSSAR, supra note 15, at 185–87. R
50 Id. at 186 (citation omitted).
51 Id.
52 Nathaniel Persily & Melissa Cully Anderson, Regulating Democracy Through Democ-
racy: The Use of Direct Legislation in Election Law Reform, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 997, 1028–29
(2005) (“For example, suffrage advocates in Oregon, one of the first adopters of direct legislation
(1902), fought perhaps the most trying campaigns for the vote. Although Oregon was an early
adopter of equal suffrage in 1912, it was only after five previous defeats in 1884, 1900, 1906, 1908,
and 1910.”).
53 KEYSSAR, supra note 15, at 186. R
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granting the right to vote only in school elections simply to placate
reformers and avoid broader voter expansions.54
In surveying the push for women’s suffrage, Professor Morgan
Kousser notes how the battle was fought at many levels, including
through local advocacy: “to gain the right to vote, advocates would
already have to exercise political power at every level from the tiniest
hamlet and precinct to the floor of Congress.”55 Early victories in mu-
nicipalities around the country likely paved the way for broader, na-
tionwide reform through statewide efforts and, ultimately, the
Nineteenth Amendment.
Of course, not all expansions of voting rights have come about
through local laws. The history of racial minority voting, for instance,
shows how local jurisdictions often denied the right to vote to minori-
ties, with federal law serving as the stopgap to overrule these prac-
tices.56 Congress was instrumental in ending some of the worst abuses
of local officials denying the franchise to African Americans by enact-
ing the Voting Rights Act of 1965.57 Yet this traditional narrative of
federal law mandating voter enfranchisement overlooks significant in-
stances in which localities led the way in expanding the franchise to
various populations. The fact that some movements, targeted specifi-
cally at expanding suffrage, had a significant local component pro-
vides an important lesson for the right to vote moving forward: local
voting rules can serve as a catalyst for broad-reaching reforms. If we
want to make voting easier, more accessible, and more universal, we
should focus on the local level.
54 Id.
55 Kousser, supra note 33 (manuscript at 17). R
56 See KEYSSAR, supra note 15, at 256–63. The history of the retraction and expansion of R
minority voting rights is quite complex. Several state constitutions initially allowed African
Americans to vote, but between 1790 and 1850 many states revised their laws to exclude blacks
from voting. See id. at 54–56. Yet blacks could sometimes vote in local elections that affected
their interests. For instance, African Americans successfully resecured their right to vote in Prov-
idence, Rhode Island, in 1843 when the state enacted a new constitution. See id. at 57; MANISHA
SINHA, THE SLAVE’S CAUSE: A HISTORY OF ABOLITION 322 (2016). Similarly, in the 1850s, Cin-
cinnati allowed African Americans to vote in school director elections for “colored” schools. See
State ex rel. Dirs. of the E. & W. Sch. Dists. v. City of Cincinnati, 19 Ohio 178, 197–98 (1850)
(upholding law allowing “colored voters” to elect the school director of a “colored” school). The
Cincinnati example is interesting because it shows how a local law provided more expansive
voting rights for racial minorities than the state constitution permitted, albeit while promoting
segregation.
57 See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.). See generally ARI BERMAN, GIVE US THE BALLOT: THE MOD-
ERN STRUGGLE FOR VOTING RIGHTS IN AMERICA (2015) (documenting the history of the civil
rights movement and the push for minority voting rights).
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II. MODERN LOCAL VOTING REFORM
In recent years, municipalities across the country have enacted, or
at least debated, local ordinances regarding the right to vote. Cities
and towns have lowered the voting age in local elections to sixteen,
granted the right to vote to noncitizens, expanded access for property-
owning nonresidents, and called for greater overall inclusion for those
otherwise disenfranchised, such as felons. This Part examines these
ordinances to highlight the grassroots nature of voting rights reform
and demonstrates that localism should be an important consideration
for anyone concerned about protecting the constitutional right to
vote.
A. Lowering the Voting Age
In 2013, the city of Takoma Park, Maryland—a suburb of Wash-
ington, D.C.—passed a charter amendment lowering the voting age
for city elections to sixteen.58 Section 601(a) of that governing docu-
ment now reads:
Every person who (1) is a resident of the City of Takoma
Park, (2) is at least sixteen (16) years of age or will be sixteen
(16) years of age on or before the date of the next City elec-
tion, (3) has resided within the corporate limits of the City
for 21 days immediately preceding the City election, (4) does
not claim voting residence or the right to vote in another ju-
risdiction, and (5) is registered to vote in accordance with the
provisions of this charter, is a qualified voter of the City ex-
cept as provided in subsection (b) of this section.59
Subsection (b) then denies voting rights to felons serving a prison
sentence, those who have been judged mentally disabled, and anyone
convicted of vote buying.60 Lowering the voting age expanded the
voter rolls in Takoma Park by about 350 people.61 Council Member
Tim Male sponsored the ordinance as a way to increase citizen partici-
pation in local elections.62 In crafting the law, Male took the advice of
Rob Richie, the director of a national organization called FairVote,
58 Powers, supra note 12. R
59 TAKOMA PARK, MD., MUN. CODE art. VI, § 601(a) (2016), http://www.codepublishing.
com/MD/TakomaPark/#!/takomaparkch/TakomaParkCH06.html#06.
60 Id. § 601(b).
61 See Annys Shin, Takoma Park 16-Year-Old Savors His History-Making Moment at the
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who thought of the idea when he read a report from Denmark saying
that younger teenagers were more likely to vote than older teens.63
The movement in Takoma Park began with a municipal Right to
Vote Resolution.64 That resolution noted that
local governments like ours have the power to enact laws
and procedures for local elections that meet or surpass fed-
eral and state election standards, that create more accounta-
ble representation, that uphold voting rights, that encourage
increased voter participation, and that promote greater
awareness of our political process through civic education.65
The resolution then affirmed that the right to vote is a fundamental
right, established a Task Force on Voting, and called on federal and
state officeholders to take actions that will protect voting rights.66 On
expanding voting opportunities, the resolution specifically directed
the Task Force to “[r]ecommend actions by the City before the 2013
elections to promote new suffrage opportunities and other participa-
tion in City government for and by residents who have turned 16,
same-day voter registration and residents who are currently on parole
or probation as a result of a felony conviction.”67 The Task Force’s
recommendations led to the ordinance that, among other things, low-
ered the voting age in Takoma Park.
Takoma Park’s initial experience with lowering the voting age—
albeit a sample of one town with a small population—is instructive. In
the November 2013 election, which included an incumbent mayor
with only a write-in challenger and no contested city council elections,
44% of the newly enfranchised and registered sixteen- and seventeen-
year-olds went to the polls, as compared to an overall turnout rate of
11%.68 Similarly, in Takoma Park’s 2014 election, 134 individuals aged
sixteen or seventeen registered to vote, and about half of them
showed up, far exceeding the 10% turnout rate among the rest of the
city’s voters.69 Although the raw numbers for this one city are small,
63 See id. I am a member of the “Leadership Circle” for a FairVote initiative called “Pro-
mote Our Vote.” See Leadership, PROMOTE OUR VOTE, http://www.promoteourvote.com/leader
ship.html [https://perma.cc/5BHG-6FHJ] (last visited May 28, 2017).





68 See J.B. Wogan, Takoma Park Sees High Turnout Among Teens After Election Reform,
GOVERNING (Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.governing.com/news/headlines/gov-maryland-city-sees-
high-turnout-among-teens-after-election-reform.html.
69 Elena Schneider, Students in Maryland Test Civic Participation and Win Right to Vote,
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and the novelty of gaining voting rights could wear off in subsequent
elections, the potential is huge if extrapolated to a larger metropolis.
Turnout among eighteen- to twenty-four-year-olds nationwide is the
lowest among all age groups,70 but that trend is reversible if sixteen-
and seventeen-year-olds begin a habit of voting earlier in their lives
when they are not also dealing with moving, entering the workforce,
or beginning college. Assuming that younger voters turn out in suffi-
cient numbers, they could impact who is elected and the policies that
affect them. Takoma Park showed that this reform is achievable city
by city throughout the country.
Hyattsville, Maryland, was the next locality to heed this mes-
sage.71 In January 2015, the Hyattsville City Council voted to lower
the voting age for town elections to sixteen.72 In the next election,
newly registered sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds voted at a rate of
25%, helping the town exceed its turnout goal.73
These successes in two small Maryland towns have been harb-
ingers of the reform movement in larger cities.74 Berkeley, California,
recently lowered the voting age to sixteen for its school board elec-
tions.75 In San Francisco, members of the San Francisco Youth Com-
mission have been advocating for the city to lower the voting age for
municipal and school district elections.76 Although the measure passed
the City’s Board of Supervisors, a referendum on the issue failed by a
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/10/us/politics/students-in-maryland-
test-civic-participation-and-win-right-to-vote.html.
70 See THOM FILE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, YOUNG-ADULT VOTING: AN ANALYSIS OF
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1964–2012, at 2 (2014), https://www.census.gov/prod/2014pubs/p20-
573.pdf.
71 See Schneider, supra note 69. R
72 Id.; see HYATTSVILLE, MD., CHARTER & CODE art. IV, § C4-1 (2015), http://
www.hyattsville.org/DocumentCenter/Home/View/340 (“Every person who is a citizen of the
United States, is at least sixteen (16) years of age, resides in the State of Maryland, resides within
the corporate limits of the City and is registered in accordance with the provisions of this Char-
ter shall be a qualified voter of the City. Every qualified voter of the City shall be entitled to
vote at any or all City elections.”).
73 See Rebecca Bennett, Ward and Warner Election Winners; City Exceeds Voter Turnout
Goal, HYATTSVILLE LIFE & TIMES (May 12, 2015, 6:12 PM), http://hyattsvillelife.com/ward-and-
warner-election-winners-city-exceeds-voter-turnout-goal/.
74 In addition to lowering the voting age in municipal elections, many states allow seven-
teen-year-olds to vote in party primaries if they will be eighteen by Election Day. See Voting in
Primaries at 17 Years Old, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Voting_in_primaries_at
_17_years_old [https://perma.cc/V57X-Z7ZC] (last visited May 28, 2017).
75 Jennings-Newhouse, supra note 3. R
76 See Laura Dudnick, Youths Seek to Lower Voting Age to 16 in SF, S.F. EXAMINER (Jan.
6, 2015), http://archives.sfexaminer.com/sanfrancisco/youths-seek-to-lower-voting-age-to-16-in-
sf/Content?oid=2916012; Green, supra note 3. R
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52%–48% margin in 2016.77 Given this close outcome, advocates plan
to put the question on the ballot again in 2020.78 Reformers are also
working to petition the Chicago City Council to consider this
change.79
Similarly, Washington, D.C., has debated whether to pass an ordi-
nance allowing sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds to vote in presiden-
tial and local elections.80 Advocates note that the city’s lawmakers
“barely listen[ed] to the District’s youths amid a spike in violence”
during the summer of 2015 and that lowering the voting age would
give younger individuals more political power.81 The D.C. proposal
goes further than the Maryland or California examples because it low-
ers the voting age not just for city elections but for the presidential
election as well. As one proponent explains, “It’s not just about hav-
ing young people vote . . . . It’s about creating a new generation of
lifelong voters.”82
Meanwhile, advocates in Lowell, Massachusetts, who under Mas-
sachusetts law must secure the state legislature’s approval to lower the
voting age in municipal elections,83 won the support of the State Sen-
ate in 2013 but have not yet convinced the State House.84 Legislators
in New Mexico and youth council members in Richmond, California,
are planning to introduce bills to lower the voting age for city elec-
77 See Press Release, Vote16USA, Historic Measure Almost Passes: More than 172,000




79 See Lower the Voting Age in Chicago, CHANGE.ORG, https://www.change.org/p/chicago-
city-council-lower-the-voting-age-in-chicago-7eb9e713-a4f1-470f-812d-6c09f97492bf [https://
perma.cc/HX6Z-EYER] (last visited Mar. 26, 2017).
80 See Youth Vote Amendment Act of 2015, D.C. Council B21-0468 (2015), http://
lims.dccouncil.us/Download/34820/B21-0468-Introduction.pdf.
81 See Aaron C. Davis, 16-Year-Olds in D.C. Could Vote for President in 2016, Under
Proposal, WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/16-year-
olds-in-dc-could-vote-for-president-in-2016-under-proposal/2015/11/03/3175fede-825d-11e5-8ba6
-cec48b74b2a7_story.html.
82 See Patrick Madden, Unlikely Advocates Push to Give 16-Year-Olds A Vote—and a
Voice, NPR (Jan. 18, 2016, 3:54 PM), http://www.npr.org/2016/01/18/463489043/unlikely-advo
cates-push-to-give-16-year-olds-a-vote-and-a-voice.
83 See infra Section III.C.2.
84 Schneider, supra note 69. The movement to lower the voting age is not occurring solely R
at the local level, at least internationally. In 2014, Scotland allowed sixteen- and seventeen-year-
olds to vote in the independence referendum on whether to remain part of the United Kingdom,
and in 2015, it granted the right to vote to sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds for all elections. See
Helen Whitehouse, 16 and 17 Year Olds Granted the Vote in All Scottish Elections, MIRROR
(UK) (June 19, 2015, 1:57 PM), http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/16-17-year-olds-granted-
5911671.
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tions or at least school board elections.85 The movement also has
gained the support of advocacy groups, such as Generation Citizen, a
nonpartisan organization that focuses on youth participation in polit-
ics and has begun an initiative called Vote16USA.86
At least one jurisdiction has lowered the voting age even below
sixteen for certain special elections. In Cambridge, Massachusetts, an-
yone aged twelve or older may vote in the city’s “Participatory
Budgeting” election.87 This election directs the city on how to use
some of its capital budget by allowing voters to select which projects
to fund.88
The first Participatory Budgeting election in Cambridge demon-
strated how expanding the right to vote inherently includes more peo-
ple in the process, making them feel they have a stake in their
community. A survey of voters showed that 2% were aged twelve to
eighteen, while 15% of respondents were born outside of the United
States (although it is not clear from the survey data how many of these
individuals are noncitizens).89 Although the numbers are small, the ex-
pansive voting rights provided a meaningful voice for these individu-
als. As one voter explained, “As a permanent resident in the U.S. who
otherwise has no political say, I’m delighted to have been able to par-
ticipate in this budgeting process.”90 Further, many voters “praised the
exposure for teenagers in the community.”91 Similarly, New York City
uses Participatory Budgeting to decide how to allocate some of its tax
funds, and anyone aged fourteen and older may vote; in the 2014–15
85 See Yamiche Alcindor, Campaign to Lower Voting Age to 16 in Local Races Ignites a
Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/10/us/politics/campaign-to-
lower-voting-age-to-16-in-local-races-ignites-a-debate.html.
86 See id.; see also Generation Citizen, Young Voices at the Ballot Box: Advancing Efforts
to Lower the Voting Age, http://generationcitizen.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/GC-Voting-
Age-Paper-2015-12-07-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/ER52-6243] (last visited May 28, 2017). I am a
member of the Vote16USA Advisory Board.
87 FAQs, CITY OF CAMBRIDGE PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING, http://pb.cambridgema.gov/
faqs [https://perma.cc/ZX5G-6YYY] (last visited May 28, 2017).
88 Id.
89 NADA ZOHDY, EVALUATING THE INAUGURAL PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING PROCESS IN
THE CITY OF CAMBRIDGE (2014–2015) 27, 28 (2015), https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/cam
bridgema/pages/181/attachments/original/1439245835/Evaluating_the_Inaugural_PB_process_in
_Cambridge_-_FINAL_with_ballot.pdf?1439245835. The number of actual young voters was
likely higher, as the report lists only the number of people who responded to the post-election
survey.
90 Id. at 29.
91 Id. at 33.
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budgeting cycle, voters under eighteen years old comprised approxi-
mately 12% of the electorate.92
Strong policy arguments favor lowering the voting age.93 First,
turning sixteen has “special significance” in our society, as that is
when most states allow individuals to obtain driver’s licenses and have
part-time jobs, and require them to pay taxes on their wages.94 Next,
the National Youth Rights Association highlights the fairness aspect
of lowering the voting age: prosecutors may charge adolescents as
adults if they commit crimes, but younger individuals may not partici-
pate in our democracy in a more positive way through voting.95 Addi-
tionally, turning eighteen (the current voting age in most places) is a
volatile time in people’s lives, when they are leaving home for the
workforce or college and are often mobile; sixteen-year-olds, by con-
trast, are more rooted in their current community, uniquely knowl-
edgeable about local issues, and just as intellectually competent as an
eighteen-year-old to select their leaders.96 Finally, studies show the
potential for a “trickle up” effect: the younger a person begins to vote,
the more likely they will sustain that habit throughout their lives.97
92 New York City Council, Participatory Budgeting Rulebook 8, http://labs.council.nyc/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/PBNYC-2016_2017-Rulebook.pdf (last visited May 28, 2017); Urban
Justice Center, A People’s Budget: A Research and Evaluation Report on Participatory Budget-
ing in New York City 5, https://cdp.urbanjustice.org/sites/default/files/CDP.WEB.doc_Report_
PBNYC_cycle4findings_20151021.pdf (last visited May 28, 2017); see Colin O’Connor, Par-
ticipatory Budgeting Grows in NYC—Why Isn’t Every Council Member Doing It?, GOTHAM GA-
ZETTE (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.gothamgazette.com/government/5946-participatory-budget
ing-grows-in-nyc-why-isnt-every-council-member-doing-it (“Nearly 60 percent of PB voters
identified as people of color; approximately one in ten were under 18; nearly 30 percent reported
an annual household income of $25,000 or below; more than a quarter were born outside of the
U.S.; nearly a quarter reported a barrier to voting in regular elections, with one in ten reporting
they were not U.S. citizens; and 63 percent identified as female.”); Participatory Budgeting, NEW
YORK CITY COUNCIL, http://pbnyc.org/ (last visited May 28, 2017).
93 See generally Joshua A. Douglas, In Defense of Lowering the Voting Age, 165 U. PA. L.
REV. ONLINE 63 (2017), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/165-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-63.pdf.
94 See Lower the Voting Age, FAIRVOTE, http://www.fairvote.org/reforms/right-to-vote-
amendment/lowering-the-voting-age/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2017). Although choosing any age
might seem arbitrary, sixteen makes the most sense given that our society imposes various adult-
like obligations at that age, such as obeying the driving laws and paying taxes on part-time
wages. Psychological studies also support sixteen as the appropriate age to begin voting. See
infra notes 100–05 and accompanying text. R
95 See Top Ten Reasons to Lower the Voting Age, NAT’L YOUTH RTS. ASS’N, http://
youthrights.org/issues/voting-age/top-ten-reasons-to-lower-the-voting-age/ (last visited May 28,
2017).
96 Id.
97 See, e.g., Yosef Bhatti & Kasper M. Hansen, Leaving the Nest and the Social Act of
Voting: Turnout Among First-Time Voters, 22 J. ELECTIONS PUB. OPINION & PARTIES 380, 397
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Lowering the voting age would also help to achieve greater fair-
ness in political representation. Young adults are underrepresented:
they comprise a significant share of the population but have no politi-
cal power until they are eighteen years old. As Professor Jane Ruther-
ford has explained:
Currently, children are vastly underrepresented politi-
cally. Although they are counted for the purpose of deter-
mining the number of representatives and constitute twenty-
six percent of an average congressional district, they cannot
vote, nor can anyone else vote on their behalf. In this sense,
they share the plight of women before the adoption of the
Nineteenth Amendment. Their numbers swell the political
power of their communities, but that political power is not
shared by them.98
Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court recently explained that current
nonvoters still have a stake in their representative democracy, mean-
ing that states can continue to count them to apportion representa-
tives and need not include just voters to delineate districts:
“Nonvoters have an important stake in many policy debates—chil-
dren, their parents, even their grandparents, for example, have a stake
in a strong public-education system—and in receiving constituent ser-
vices, such as help navigating public-benefits bureaucracies.”99 The
same logic applies to grant these constituencies a voice in who repre-
sents them.
Sixteen-year-olds are mature enough—or at least as mature as
individuals aged eighteen or older—to inform themselves sufficiently
and make rational voting decisions. Professor Vivian E. Hamilton sur-
veyed various fields, such as behavioral and developmental psychol-
ogy and social and cognitive neuroscience, to show that individuals
(2012), http://www.promoteourvote.com/uploads/9/2/2/7/9227685/leaving_the_nest_and_the_so
cial_act_of_voting.pdf; see also Lower the Voting Age, supra note 94. R
98 Jane Rutherford, One Child, One Vote: Proxies for Parents, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1463, 1465
(1998) (footnote omitted) (advocating not to lower the voting age but instead to give a child’s
representative a proxy vote to increase children’s political influence); see also Annette R. Ap-
pell, The Child Question, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1137, 1172–73 (“Children’s suffrage advocates
note that the franchise would promote children’s unique interests, provide civic educational ben-
efits for children, and create opportunities for parental involvement and assistance in effecting
children’s right to vote. Indeed, in a country that spends at best 2.2% of its gross domestic
product and less than 10% of the federal budget on children, children’s political power and
authority could lead to a larger share of the pie.” (footnotes omitted)); Aoife Daly, Demonstrat-
ing Positive Obligations: Children’s Rights and Peaceful Protest in International Law, 45 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 763, 770 (2013) (“Children consistently express that they wish to have
greater participation in political matters . . . .”).
99 Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1132 (2016).
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reach an adult-like capacity to make competent decisions such as vot-
ing by age sixteen.100 The studies conclude that the ability of young
individuals to engage in well-informed and rational decisionmaking is
highly context-specific: “adolescents reliably reach adultlike cognitive-
processing capacities by ages fifteen or sixteen, but . . . numerous fac-
tors (e.g., situations involving high levels of emotion or stress, peer
pressure, or time pressure) will predictably compromise their cogni-
tive performance.”101 Voting, however, is not a situation that typically
entails unusual emotion, stress, or even peer pressure (given the secret
ballot).102 Voting instead requires civic engagement and knowledge. In
a study using national survey data, researchers found that sixteen- and
seventeen-year-olds scored about the same as adults on measures of
political tolerance, skill, efficacy, and interest:
[C]ivic knowledge increases between ages 14 and 16 and then
changes relatively little thereafter, although, 18-year-olds
might be slightly higher in civic knowledge than are 16-year-
olds. Most important . . . , 16-year-olds apparently know as
much about the American political system as do many young
adults; indeed, the average score for 16-year-olds is higher
than the averages for civic knowledge for 19-, 21-, and 23-
year-olds, all of whom are entitled to vote.103
The study concludes that “[b]ased on . . . developmental trajecto-
ries . . . , there is little empirical reason to award the vote to 18-year-
olds but to deny it to 16-year-olds.”104 In another study of around one
thousand adolescents, researchers found that “scores [of cognitive
ability] increased between ages 11 and 16 and then leveled off, with no
improvement after this age.”105
100 Vivian E. Hamilton, Democratic Inclusion, Cognitive Development, and the Age of Elec-
toral Majority, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1447 (2012).
101 Id. at 1452; see also id. at 1449 (noting that “by midadolescence, when making unpres-
sured, considered decisions—like those required to privately cast a ballot in an election that has
unfolded over time—their cognitive competencies are mature”).
102 Id. at 1511–12 (“Elections unfold over a period of time, giving voters the opportunity to
deliberate and evaluate options without undue pressure. Many sources of information are read-
ily available over a period of time as well, which voters can use as a kind of scaffolding or
heuristics to help them evaluate their choices—broadcast debates, endorsements of candidates,
party affiliations, etc. Voting itself is done anonymously and in private, which diminishes the
concern that adolescents’ choices will be unduly pressured or influenced by peers.”).
103 Daniel Hart & Robert Atkins, American Sixteen- and Seventeen-Year-Olds Are Ready
to Vote, 633 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 201, 207–08 (2011).
104 Id. at 213.
105 Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature than Adults?: Minors’ Access to
Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop,” 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\85-4\GWN401.txt unknown Seq: 22  1-SEP-17 14:10
1060 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:1039
Assuming that governments are legitimate only if all competent
stakeholders can participate in the selection of the leaders, then de-
mocracy requires expanding the right to vote to sixteen- and seven-
teen-year-olds, as these individuals have reached a sufficient cognitive
level for electoral competence.106 The studies also show that setting
the age at sixteen is not arbitrary and is not a slippery slope to giving
the right to vote to even younger children. Adolescents gain the cogni-
tive capacity to begin civic participation by at least age sixteen, but the
psychological studies do not support lowering the voting age to indi-
viduals younger than sixteen.107
To those who think that sixteen-year-olds are too impulsive or
immature to vote, or that their brains are not yet fully developed, psy-
chologists note that there is a variation in cognitive capacity depend-
ing on the tasks adolescents are completing.108 Sixteen-year-olds may
not be as developed as older individuals to avoid impulsive, rash judg-
ments, but they are just as competent to make reasoned decisions like
voting. As one psychology professor explains:
Adolescents’ judgment in situations that permit measured
decision-making and consultation with others—what psy-
chologists call “cold cognition”—is just as mature as that of
adults by 16. . . .
. . . Cold cognition is relevant to matters such as vot-
ing . . . . Adolescents can gather evidence, consult with others
and take time before making a decision. Adolescents may
583, 592 (2009) (arguing for greater allowance for sixteen-year-olds to make their own health
care decisions).
106 See Hamilton, supra note 100, at 1479 (advocating for a “democratic principle of pre- R
sumptive inclusion”); infra notes 109–11 and accompanying text. R
107 See Hart & Atkins, supra note 103, at 201 (“We also indicate that the developmental R
evidence suggests that those younger than 16 years of age should be excluded from the electo-
rate.”); id. at 210 (“Fourteen-year-olds receive lower scores for political skill than every age
between ages 19 and 30; in contrast, the average for 16-year-olds is the same as, or higher than,
that of six ages between ages 19 and 30.”).
108 See id. at 220 (“While it is likely true that adolescents’ capacities to restrain impulsive,
emotional behavior may be reduced relative to that of adults, and their life experiences are
relatively circumscribed, these capacities do not figure prominently in citizenship and particu-
larly in voting. Neither the sense of membership, the concern with rights, nor the ability to
participate in the community rests heavily upon the ability to resist emotional, impulsive actions.
Citizenship and voting in the electoral process require, for the most part, decisions made over
long periods of time, which allows for deliberation and discussion with others. To date, there is
no neurological evidence that indicates that 16- and 17-year-olds lack the requisite neurological
maturation necessary for citizenship or for responsible voting; nor is there evidence to indicate
that a breadth of life experience is necessary for effective citizenship.”).
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make bad choices, but statistically speaking, they won’t make
them any more often than adults.109
Even if sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds are mature enough to
vote, some may argue that their parents will place an undue influence
on them, in essence giving the parents a second vote through their
children. But the evidence refutes this objection. Leading up to the
Scottish Independence vote in September 2014, a research study
found that children aged sixteen and seventeen would not just copy
their parents; just under half of them had opposing views and planned
to vote differently from their parents.110 Advocates for lowering the
voting age also note that “undue influence” of husbands was an argu-
ment against women’s suffrage, and yet wives obviously do not always
follow their husbands at the ballot box.111
Interesting doctrinal questions may arise when jurisdictions per-
mit those under eighteen to vote, especially if their parents, for
whatever reason, refuse to allow them to participate. Which is more
important: the minors’ right to vote, or the parents’ right to direct the
upbringing of their children? Does the locally enacted right to vote
trump the constitutional rights of parents? Although courts have not
yet faced this question, there is a strong argument for the right of ado-
lescents to vote to win out if the issue ever arises. Voting, after all, is a
fundamental right. It provides the foundation of our democracy. Chil-
dren are part of and affected by that democracy. Although parents
have a constitutional right to direct the upbringing and education of
their children,112 the right to vote is more important because it is “pre-
servative of other basic civil and political rights.”113 Allowing youth to
vote is preservative of youth rights in our democracy. In essence, vot-
ing is paramount because of its importance to democratic legitimacy.
109 Laurence Steinberg, A 16-Year-Old Is As Good as an 18-Year-Old—or a 40-Year-Old—
at Voting, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2014, 5:15 PM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-
steinberg-lower-voting-age-20141104-story.html; see also Joshua Gans, Why It’s Time to Give
Children the Right to Vote, FORBES (Apr. 20, 2012, 5:17 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/joshua-
gans/2012/04/20/its-time-to-give-children-the-vote/.
110 See Emma Langman, Scottish Independence: Research Finds Young Voters ‘Don’t Copy
Parents,’ BBC NEWS (Mar 4, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-
26265299; see also JAN EICHHORN, SCOTCEN SOC. RESEARCH, WILL 16 AND 17 YEAR OLDS
MAKE A DIFFERENCE IN THE REFERENDUM? 12 (2013), http://www.scotcen.org.uk/media/205540
/131129_will-16-and-17-years-olds-make-a-difference.pdf (“Overall, just 56% of young people
propose to vote the same way as the parents who gave permission for them to be interviewed.”).
111 See Carrie Kirby, The Case for Letting Teens Vote in Local Elections, CITYLAB (Oct. 6,
2015), http://www.citylab.com/politics/2015/10/the-case-for-letting-teens-vote-in-local-elections/
408853/.
112 See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925).
113 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964).
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If the relevant governmental entity has determined that young people
should participate, then the views of individual parents should not
outweigh that expansion of democratic participation without a suffi-
ciently compelling rationale.114
Both sound policy and political theory strongly favor lowering the
voting age. The key democratic ideal should be a desire to include as
many people as possible in the electorate to improve democratic legit-
imacy. The mechanism by which we accomplish this voter expansion is
extremely important. Local ordinances have begun the reform effort.
Victories in small towns can have a “trickle across” and “trickle up”
effect, moving to other cities and then states around the country.
These municipal laws can serve as the catalyst for nationwide expan-
sion of the right to vote.
B. Noncitizen Voting
In most local elections in America, and in all federal elections,
only U.S. citizens may vote.115 But that is not the rule for all local
114 Opponents might suggest that a parent should have the ability to reject a child’s desire
to vote given a parent’s constitutionally protected role in directing the upbringing and education
of their children. As one commentator notes,
[U]nlike those of any adult, the rights of children are always defined in relation to
their parents, and parents have an affirmative right and duty to direct the upbring-
ing and education of their children. In part, this right “rests on a presumption that
parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judg-
ment required for making life’s difficult decisions.” The parents’ duty similarly rests
on their role of preparing the child for the obligations of adulthood.
Jocelyn Floyd, Note, The Power of the Parental Trump Card: How and Why Frazier v. Winn Got
It Right, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 791, 792–93 (2010) (footnotes omitted). Yet even under this
rationale, voting is an “obligation of adulthood,” suggesting that parents would have a harder
time justifying their refusal to allow their children to take part in the election if the local jurisdic-
tion has expanded voting to include them. Indeed, the very fact that the local jurisdiction has
granted sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds the right to vote indicates that the polity believes that
these youth do possess the maturity and experience necessary to help make choices for the com-
munity—that they are, with respect to voting, the same as adults. That said, there could be
compelling individual circumstances, such as a religious objection, that might justify a parent’s
refusal to allow a minor to vote.
115 For a history of citizenship requirements for voting, see RON HAYDUK, DEMOCRACY
FOR ALL: RESTORING IMMIGRANT VOTING RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES (2006). Congress has
prohibited noncitizens from making campaign contributions to any federal, state, or local elec-
tions. See 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(1)(A) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for a foreign national, directly
or indirectly, to make a contribution or donation of money or other thing of value, or to make an
express or implied promise to make a contribution or donation, in connection with a Federal,
State, or local election . . . .”). Yet this provision does not explicitly forbid voting, as it applies
only to campaign expenditures. Further, in arguing to uphold this law against a First Amend-
ment challenge, the federal government noted in its brief, “That some local governments grant
noncitizens limited voting rights is irrelevant to the proper disposition of appellants’ as-applied
challenge, since appellants have not alleged a desire to spend money to influence any local elec-
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elections. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that
“citizenship has not in all cases been made a condition precedent to
the enjoyment of the right of suffrage. Thus, in Missouri, persons of
foreign birth, who have declared their intention to become citizens of
the United States, may under certain circumstances vote.”116 Indeed,
“it appears to be settled doctrine that, so far as the federal Constitu-
tion is concerned, alien suffrage is entirely discretionary—neither con-
stitutionally compelled nor constitutionally forbidden.”117 The history
of voting rights shows an expansion, and then contraction, of the right
to vote for noncitizens.118 “[T]he United States has a long history of
noncitizen voting,” at least until the 1920s, when xenophobia stem-
ming from World War I reduced voting opportunities across the coun-
try for noncitizens.119 Even though many people may equate voting
with the privilege of citizenship, localities have expanded the right to
vote for noncitizens.
Currently, only Takoma Park (which also lowered its voting
age120) and five other Maryland towns allow noncitizens to vote in all
municipal elections.121 The Takoma Park rule came about in 1992 after
“a task force ‘started redrawing voting districts to match the 1990 cen-
sus and noticed that many districts in the city of 15,000 had dispropor-
tionate shares of noncitizens.’”122
Some large jurisdictions allow resident noncitizens to vote in cer-
tain elections where these individuals may have a particular interest,
tion in which they have the right to vote.” Motion to Dismiss or Affirm at 25, Bluman v. FEC,
565 U.S. 1104 (2012) (No. 11-275), 2011 WL 5548718, at *25; see also In re Wehlitz, 16 Wis. 443,
446–48 (1863) (noting that “[u]nder our complex system of government there may be a citizen of
a state who is not a citizen of the United States in the full sense of the term” and that “it may be
possible for the state to confer the right of voting on certain persons without making them citi-
zens”). Thus, this provision of federal law, which prohibits noncitizens from spending money on
political campaigns, does not preempt local laws that allow noncitizens to vote in local elections.
116 Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 177 (1874).
117 Gerald L. Neuman, “We Are the People”: Alien Suffrage in German and American Per-
spective, 13 MICH. J. INT’L L. 259, 292 (1992).
118 See HAYDUK, supra note 115, at 4. R
119 See Virginia Harper-Ho, Noncitizen Voting Rights: The History, the Law and Current
Prospects for Change, 18 LAW & INEQ. 271, 271, 282 (2000) (advocating for the expansion of
voting rights for resident aliens in local elections); see also id. at 273 (“During the nineteenth
century, at least twenty-two states and territories gave voting rights to aliens.” (citing Leon E.
Aylsworth, The Passing of Alien Suffrage, 25 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 114, 114–16 (1931))).
120 See supra Section II.A.
121 TAKOMA PARK, MD., MUN. CODE art. VI, § 601(a) (2016) (requiring voters to be “re-
sidents” of Takoma Park); see Tara Kini, Comment, Sharing the Vote: Noncitizen Voting Rights
in Local School Board Elections, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 271, 296 (2005).
122 Harper-Ho, supra note 119, at 311 (quoting Takoma Park Asks Whether to Give Non- R
Citizens a Say, BALT. SUN, Oct. 27, 1991, at 5B).
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such as for the school board. Chicago, for instance, allows noncitizens
to vote in school council elections, as did New York City from 1968
until 2002, when the city disbanded its elected school boards.123 Two
Massachusetts towns, Cambridge and Amherst, also have passed laws
granting the right to vote to noncitizens, but these ordinances cannot
go into effect unless the state legislature approves them.124
Other jurisdictions are now debating whether to expand the voter
rolls to include noncitizens. New York City already allows noncitizens
to vote in its Participatory Budgeting elections, which help to direct
the allocation of tax funds for specific projects.125 The City is further
considering an ordinance to allow noncitizens to vote in all elections,
which would add up to 800,000 people to the voting rolls.126 The pro-
posal, debated in 2013, would allow noncitizen legal residents who
have lived in New York City for six months to vote in mayoral and city
council elections.127 The sponsor of the bill argued that “it’s unfair to
deny voting rights to law-abiding noncitizens who pay taxes: ‘They
contribute to society but are ultimately disenfranchised because they
cannot vote.’”128 Although thirty-one of the fifty-one New York City
Council Members supported the ordinance, Mayor Michael Bloom-
berg opposed it, and the Speaker of the Council blocked a final vote
on the law.129 The measure could come before the City Council again,
especially as Mayor Bill de Blasio might support the idea.130 These
examples show that the debate on noncitizen voting is occurring
around America,131 as well as internationally, such as in Toronto, Van-
couver, and various European countries.132
123 Kini, supra note 121, at 271 n.1. R
124 Id.; cf. infra Section III.B.
125 See New York City Council, Participatory Budgeting Rulebook 9 (2016), http://
labs.council.nyc/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/PBNYC-2016_2017-Rulebook.pdf; Participatory
Budgeting, NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL, http://pbnyc.org/ (last visited May 28, 2017).
126 See Aliyah Frumin, NYC Lawmakers Consider Allowing Non-Citizen Immigrants to
Vote, MSNBC (May 13, 2013, 8:47 AM), http://www.msnbc.com/hardball/nyc-lawmakers-consid
er-allowing-non-citizen-i.
127 See Erin Durkin, Council Weighs Bill to Give Noncitizen Immigrants Voting Rights,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 9, 2013, 9:44 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/council-
weighs-bill-give-noncitizen-immigrants-voting-rights-article-1.1340007.
128 Id.
129 See John Fund, Will New York City Give Non-Citizens the Right to Vote?, NAT’L REV.
(Apr. 6, 2015, 9:40 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/416495/will-new-york-city-give-
non-citizens-right-vote-john-fund.
130 See id.
131 See Around the U.S., IVOTE, http://www.ivotenyc.org/?page_id=473 [https://perma.cc/
VV6C-3VWH] (last visited May 28, 2017) (providing summary of the debate in various states).
132 See Ayelet Shachar, Earned Citizenship: Property Lessons for Immigration Reform, 23
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 110, 130 n.91 (2011).
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Both theoretical and practical reasons support the expansion of
voting rights to noncitizens. As Professor and now Congressman Ja-
mie Raskin has explained, “the disenfranchisement of aliens at the
local level is vulnerable to deep theoretical objections since resident
aliens—who are governed, taxed, and often drafted just like citizens—
have a strong democratic claim to being considered members, indeed
citizens, of their local communities.”133 Put another way, “[a]s a practi-
cal matter, noncitizens do not have political power because they do
not have the right to vote; inherent in this lack of voting power is an
absence of electoral power.”134 Under a prevailing theory of democ-
racy, the government is legitimate only by the consent of the gov-
erned, which includes noncitizens who must follow the law; those with
equal responsibilities in society should have an equal right to vote.135
Moreover, local residents—whether they are citizens or not—care
about, and should have a say in, local affairs. Allowing them to vote
facilitates greater participation in the community, which may en-
courage these voters to become citizens.136 Expanding noncitizen vot-
ing could affect more than ten million legal noncitizen residents in the
United States.137
From a theoretical standpoint, local jurisdictions should espouse
and implement a broad theory of democracy.138 Lawful permanent re-
sidents have a stake in the governance of their local communities.139
At a minimum, noncitizens have a particular interest in school board
elections, as they legally send their children to public school. But be-
yond the substance of this policy recommendation, the location of the
133 Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Theo-
retical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391, 1394 (1993).
134 Harper-Ho, supra note 119, at 310–11. R
135 See id. at 295–98; see also Bryant Yuan Fu Yang, Note, Fighting for an Equal Voice: Past
and Present Struggle for Noncitizen Enfranchisement, 13 ASIAN AM. L.J. 57, 58 (2006) (advocat-
ing for noncitizen voting rights “to promote assimilation, to grant equity, to protect their civil
rights, and to provide a viable solution to educational inequities within public schools”).
136 Kini, supra note 121, at 272 (“Noncitizen voting in local elections promotes civic partici- R
pation and citizenship because it gives noncitizens a stake in their communities and a sense that
they can make a difference. Exposure to the benefits of civic participation at the local level
encourages noncitizens to naturalize so that they can then also participate in state and federal
elections.”). See generally Kathleen Coll, Citizenship Acts and Immigrant Voting Rights Move-
ments in the US, 15 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 993 (2011), https://www.usfca.edu/sites/default/files/pdfs/
faculty/pub-coll-2011citizenshipstudies.pdf (highlighting the impact of enfranchising noncitizens
in local elections on “notions of national belonging”).
137 See Harper-Ho, supra note 119, at 284. R
138 See infra Section III.A.
139 I am not aware of any municipalities that allow illegal aliens to vote. It suffices to say,
however, that if someone is in the country illegally, a jurisdiction is more than justified in deny-
ing the right to vote to that person.
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debate is also important: this discussion is occurring—and should con-
tinue to occur—at the local level. Municipal laws have driven the
movement to expand the franchise to noncitizens.140
C. Nonresident Voting
Various jurisdictions, such as vacation towns, allow nonresident
property owners to vote. Eleven states have statutes explicitly permit-
ting nonresidents to vote in local elections if the local jurisdictions so
choose.141 For instance, in Jefferson County, Tennessee, nonresident
property owners who register their property with the local election
office may vote in the city’s elections.142
Delaware’s rule is particularly franchise-enhancing. The state’s
statute provides that if a municipality allows nonresidents to vote,
then the municipality may not amend its charter to take that right to
vote away.143 In essence, the Delaware law is a one-way ratchet: juris-
dictions may expand, but not restrict, voting rights in local elections
for nonresidents.
The rationale for these rules is to give those who own property a
say in the policies that may affect their investment, even if the owners
do not live in the town full-time. For instance, the Town of Mountain
Village, Colorado, explicitly justified in its town charter its decision to
allow nonresident property owners to vote:
1. Like many resorts, the nature of the economy and the life-
style of the people of the Town are, and will in the future
140 See Raskin, supra note 133, at 1396–97 (“If the democratic argument for alien suffrage R
in our history can be recaptured and reconstructed, it is possible that Takoma Park will become
an early precedent for grass-roots constitutional politics in the twenty-first century.”).
141 See Voting by Nonresidents and Noncitizens, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb. 27,
2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/non-resident-and-non-citizen-vot-
ing.aspx. These states are Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Ne-
braska, New Mexico, Oregon, Tennessee, and Wyoming. See id. (citing statutes). The National
Conference of State Legislatures also lists Montana as allowing local jurisdictions to pass nonres-
ident voting ordinances, but the Montana legislature repealed that provision in 2015. See MONT.
CODE ANN. § 7-13-2255 (2015).
142 See, e.g., Non-Resident Property Rights Voting, JEFFERSON COUNTY, TENN., http://www.
jeffersoncountytn.gov/government/election-commission/non-resident-property-rights-voting/
[https://perma.cc/4JHJ-6PL9] (last visited May 28, 2017).
143 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 835(b) (2011) (“No municipal corporation charter which per-
mits nonresident persons to vote in any municipal election or to hold any municipal office shall
be amended, pursuant to this chapter, so as to eliminate or limit the right of nonresident persons
to vote or hold office, nor shall the percentage of nonresident officials allowed or required be
changed.”); see also Nonresident Property Owners and Voting in Local Elections: A Paradigm
Shift?, CANVASS: STATES & ELECTION REFORM, Oct. 2008, at 1–2, http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/
documents/legismgt/elect/Canvass_Vol5A.pdf.
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remain, unusual. Furthermore, the fact that many of the
Town’s present and future residential and commercial prop-
erty owners maintain their primary residences outside of the
Town, making them part-time second-home non-residents, is
also unusual. Although these facts are not substantially dif-
ferent from most resort towns, they are very unusual for con-
ventional small as well as large towns.
2. The framers of this Charter took cognizance of the above-
mentioned singular state of affairs, most especially the fact
that a large number of the property owners of the Town are,
and will continue to be, only part-time residents of their
Town by granting to them the right to vote on those issues
that are strictly limited in nature to Town matters.144
In a challenge to the Mountain Village charter under the Federal
Equal Protection Clause, the Tenth Circuit held that because the rule
was franchise-expanding instead of franchise-restricting, rational basis
review applied.145 Under that standard, the Town had a reasonable
justification for allowing nonresident property owners to vote: they
“have a sufficient interest in Town affairs.”146 Similarly, a Colorado
state court ruled that although the Town could not enact a rule that is
more restrictive than the state constitution’s voter qualification re-
quirements, it could expand voting rules to enfranchise more people
for local elections.147
Nonresident property owners also have become involved in the
political discussion in their communities. For instance, some nonresi-
dents have won seats on the local city council in Rehoboth Beach,
144 May v. Town of Mountain Village, 132 F.3d 576, 579 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting section
1.4(b) of the town’s charter).
145 Id. at 580 (“Of critical importance to any decision here is the fact that Section 2.4(b) of
the Town Charter does not restrict the right to vote—it expands it to include nonresidents own-
ing real property in the Town.”).
146 Id. at 582; see also Glisson v. Mayor & Councilmen of Savannah Beach, 346 F.2d 135,
137 (5th Cir. 1965) (“It is apparent from the face of this legislation that there could be a logical
and sensible reason for permitting non-residents owning property in the municipality to vote in
the municipal elections on an equal basis with resident persons whether or not they are property
owners. The nexus between the two is that each of them obviously has an interest in the opera-
tion of the city government.”).
147 May v. Town of Mountain Village, 969 P.2d 790, 795–96 (Colo. App. 1998). It is unclear,
however, how a court might construe a local ordinance that grants multiple votes for individuals
who own multiple properties in the locality; granting people additional votes could, in theory,
violate the one person, one vote principle of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), because
some people will have a greater say than others. There might also be a vote dilution concern with
respect to resident voters who do not own property.
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Delaware.148 Indeed, nonresidents have substantial influence in
Rehoboth Beach given that they make up about three-fourths of all
property owners.149
Yet nonresident property owners likely cannot force a jurisdiction
to allow them to vote; a state may validly impose a “single domicile”
rule to require voters to choose between voting in their place of domi-
cile or their vacation home.150
In sum, nonresident property owners have enjoyed expansion of
the right to vote in jurisdictions where the municipality has deter-
mined that they have a particular stake in the local elections.151 In this
way, local laws play a significant role in dictating the size and scope of
the electorate.
D. Other Voting Reforms Through Local Laws
Although most franchise-enhancing activity at the local level has
involved younger voters, noncitizens, and nonresidents, other individ-
uals also have benefited from municipal ordinances. Takoma Park, the
first municipality to lower the voting age to sixteen, also enfranchised
felons who have completed their sentences.152 Reform groups have
touted the power of local laws to remove felon disenfranchisement,153
but so far, no other jurisdictions have followed suit. Nevertheless, as
the organization FairVote has explained, local voting rules can expand
access to the ballot, improve Election Day processes, and make voting
smoother:
148 See Lisa A. Phillips, The Principle of 2nd Home, 2nd Vote, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/22/realestate/greathomes/22politics.html.
149 Id. Nonresident political activity also encompasses more than just voting: “For
Rehoboth Beach’s concerned part-timers, involvement often goes beyond the voting booth.
Some say they routinely stretch their weekends to attend Monday night meetings of the board of
commissioners, the city’s governing body.” Id.
150 See, e.g., Wit v. Berman, 306 F.3d 1256, 1260, 1263 (2d Cir. 2002) (upholding New York
Election Law that forbids individuals from voting in multiple locations against challenge from
voters who own vacation homes). But see Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Note, Dual Resident Voting:
Traditional Disenfranchisement and Prospects for Change, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1954, 1958
(2002) (arguing that “excluding dual residents from voting in a second-home community simply
because they are also registered to vote in another community violates the Equal Protection
Clause”).
151 As an international analogy, some countries allow nonresident citizens who live in a
different country to vote in the homeland’s elections. See Caroline Carter, Note, The Right to
Vote for Non-Resident Citizens: Considered Through the Example of East Timor, 46 TEX. INT’L
L.J. 655, 671 (2011).
152 See Powers, supra note 12; supra Section II.A. R
153 See FairVote, The Municipal Right to Vote: The Future of Voting Rights, http://
archive.fairvote.org/media/rtv/munitwopager.pdf (last visited May 28, 2017).
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The breadth of issues that could be addressed through a Mu-
nicipal Right to Vote are infinite, though research must be
done to ascertain what powers a particular state has granted
to cities for election administration. Nevertheless, it seems
clear that at least some cities could use a Municipal Right to
Vote to pass felon re-enfranchisement, election day or uni-
versal voter registration, paper ballots, early and weekend
voting, foreign language ballots, and other such ordinances
for city elections.154
As another example, municipalities could use local laws to promote
compulsory voting, which ultimately could spread nationwide.155
Moreover, even if municipalities do not target a specific group of
voters, they can enact resolutions touting the importance of voting.
Takoma Park, Maryland, passed a resolution affirming that “an indi-
vidual right to vote is a fundamental American right, and fundamental
rights should be guaranteed to all Americans in the U.S. Constitu-
tion.”156 Although this resolution does not have any force of law, it
still provides a beneficial signal to Takoma Park’s residents that the
City takes the importance of voting seriously. Given that voting actu-
ally happens at local precincts, this signal can have a significant impact
on the civil discourse among the electorate.157 Similarly, Montgomery
County, Maryland, convened a Right to Vote Task Force that issued a
seventy-six page report with various recommendations for improving
the voting process, such as enhancing online registration, adopting
same-day voter registration, and improving ballot design, among
others.158 Once again, while not having the force of law itself, this re-
port is highly influential in beginning a needed conversation—among
those who actually administer elections—on best practices. Because it
is easier to enact local laws than state or national laws, these kinds of
resolutions can serve as catalysts for broader reform.
154 Id.
155 See Nicholas Stephanopoulos, A Feasible Roadmap to Compulsory Voting, ATLANTIC
(Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/a-feasible-roadmap-to-com
pulsory-voting/413422/ (“[I]f reformers were to start at the municipal level, they could set into
motion forces that might lead to its nationwide adoption.”).
156 City of Takoma Park, Md., Res. 2013-25 (May 13, 2013) http://www.promoteourvote.
com/uploads/9/2/2/7/9227685/takoma_park_right_to_vote_resolution.pdf.
157 Cf. Joshua A. Douglas, Election Law and Civil Discourse: The Promise of ADR, 27
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 291, 299–300 (2012) (discussing the role of courts and the media on
civil discourse).
158 MONTGOMERY CTY. RIGHT TO VOTE TASK FORCE, REPORT OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE
TASK FORCE (2014), http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/COUNCIL/Resources/Files/RE
PORTS/RightToVoteTaskForce/RightToVoteTaskForceReport.pdf.
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III. POLICY AND LAW
Debate on local voting rights is nascent yet robust. More and
more jurisdictions are contemplating whether to expand the franchise
or otherwise alter the rules for local elections.159 We should encourage
our policymakers across the country to join this movement. Civil re-
forms often start at the local level. Given that municipalities elect
their own governments, they should dictate who may participate in
those elections.
Yet inevitably, as localities enact ordinances expanding the right
to vote, courts will be called upon to judge their validity. Someone
may bring a lawsuit once a municipality passes an ordinance or in the
context of an election itself. Or perhaps, in a close election, the losing
candidate will argue that the election results are invalid because the
city allowed some people to vote who otherwise should not enjoy the
franchise. Either way, in this age of highly litigious campaigns, a judi-
cial challenge is quite likely. Courts therefore need a theoretical
framework to decide the validity of these local rules on voting rights.
As this Part explains, city and town elected officials, and the peo-
ple themselves, may grant the right to vote to previously excluded in-
dividuals. Localities should expand voting rights because doing so will
include more people in the process, create a habit of voting (especially
for younger voters), make government more responsive to local con-
stituencies, and enhance the legitimacy of the winners.160 If there are
explicit state constitutional or legislative hurdles to local control of
elections, then states should reform their laws. Courts, when faced
with a challenge to a local rule expanding the franchise, should defer
to the local ordinance with a presumption of validity if there is any
room under state law to allow the voter expansion.
A. Benefits of Expanding the Electorate
Localities should reform their rules on the right to vote by broad-
ening the electorate. In particular, cities and towns should enact ordi-
nances that affirm the importance of voting and expand voter access.
As Alexis de Tocqueville once said, “local assemblies of citizens con-
stitute the strength of free nations. . . . A nation may establish a sys-
159 See Joshua A. Douglas, Local Democracy on the Ballot, 111 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE
173, 178–84 (2017), http://northwesternlawreview.org/online/local-democracy-ballot.
160 See supra Part II.
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tem of free government, but without the spirit of municipal
institutions it cannot have the spirit of liberty.”161
Political inclusiveness is inherently desirable to increase the legiti-
macy of elected officials.162 A common theory of democracy is that the
people subject to a government and its laws must collectively consent
to societal rules through elections.163 Increased participation will help
to make elected officials more responsive to the local population. As a
general rule, then, greater participation is good for democratic
legitimacy.
People are closest to their local representatives.164 If democratic
legitimacy stems from enjoying the consent of the governed, then the
“governed” should include as many competent people as possible who
have a stake in governmental affairs.165 Local governments pass many
laws that have real world effects every day. Individuals often are ac-
tively involved in their community debates; democracy flourishes the
most at the local level. Broadening the right to vote in local elections
is thus paramount to achieving a well-functioning democracy.
Localities should expand the right to vote by adopting a theory of
democracy that favors inclusiveness.166 Crafting a local right-to-vote
ordinance will force communities to delineate who has a stake in local
161 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 60 (Henry Reeve trans., Colo-
nial Press 1899).
162 See John Payton, Democracy and Diversity, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 569, 572, 581–82 (2008); cf.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003) (“Effective participation by members of all racial
and ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream of one Nation, indivisi-
ble, is to be realized.”).
163 See, e.g., DAVID M. ESTLUND, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL FRAME-
WORK 66 (2008) (“Democracy, the authorization of laws collectively by the people who are sub-
ject to them, is inseparable from voting.”); see also Hamilton, supra note 100, at 1476 (“A typical R
account of democracy provides that, in order for a political system to qualify as democratic, the
people subject to its laws must collectively authorize them. A democratic government thus derives
its authority from the ‘the people’ who are the individual members of the political community.”
(footnote omitted)).
164 As Professor Heather Gerken has described, our political system is highly decentral-
ized, with important governmental units that are even smaller than cities or towns. Thus, she
argues, recognizing “federalism-all-the-way-down” would include an inquiry into the processes
of special-purpose governmental units. See Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the
Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 22 (2010). Considering “federalism-all-the-way-down” pro-
vides further support for expanding voting rights for the smallest governmental units that hold
elections.
165 See Hamilton, supra note 100, at 1479. R
166 Cf. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 897 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)
(“The choice [between governmental structures] is inherently a political one, and depends upon
the selection of a theory for defining the fully ‘effective’ vote—at bottom, a theory for defining
effective participation in representative government. In short, what a court is actually asked to
do in a vote dilution case is ‘to choose among competing bases of representation—ultimately,
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governance. This action will make local governments more responsive
to all of their constituents and better expositors of local democracy.
As a guiding principle, municipalities should enfranchise individ-
uals who have a sufficiently close nexus to local governance and have
both the ability and the incentive to make informed choices about
who should lead them.167 In essence, the current governing body or
electorate of a city or town should decide that current nonvoters have
a sufficient stake in local affairs such that the jurisdiction should in-
clude them in local democracy. State constitutions and state legislation
already provide a baseline for an eligible voter: someone who is at
least eighteen years old, a U.S. citizen, a resident of the relevant juris-
diction, not mentally incompetent, and (in most states) not a felon.168
The sacred value inherent in participatory democracy allows, if not
encourages, local jurisdictions to add to that list. Perhaps many chil-
dren of noncitizens are enrolled in a town’s schools such that their
parents should have input in school governance.169 Perhaps nonresi-
dents who work in the town or own property there should have a say
over local taxation.170 Perhaps the current electorate finds that six-
teen- and seventeen-year-olds have a sufficient stake in local laws and
that they are cognitively competent enough to make informed voting
decisions such that the municipality should lower the voting age.171
Greater voting participation from these groups can also lead to
greater participation in other civic endeavors. Of course, the current
municipal governing body would have to expand the right to vote to
additional groups, so current politicians and their constituents must
decide to include more people.172 Sound policy arguments have al-
really, among competing theories of political philosophy.’” (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
300 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting))).
167 See Hamilton, supra note 100, at 1482–83 (highlighting the two criteria that most politi- R
cal theorists have identified as requirements for electoral inclusion: connection to the community
and competence to make voting decisions).
168 See Douglas, supra note 6, at 101–02. R
169 See Kini, supra note 121, at 271 n.1. R
170 See, e.g., Non-Resident Property Rights Voting, supra note 142. R
171 See supra Section II.A.
172 As David Schleicher convincingly argues, discerning who has the authority to expand
voter access presents a “boundary problem”: why should today’s current electorate have any say
in formulating the scope of tomorrow’s electorate? See David Schleicher, The Boundary Prob-
lem and the Changing Case Against Deference in Election Law Cases: Lessons from Local Gov-
ernment Law, 15 ELECTION L.J. 247, 249–250 (2016). Yet the reality is that current legislators or
voters (through ballot initiatives) do enact laws that dictate voter qualifications. Id. at 255. The-
ory aside, the way to expand the franchise to additional groups is to have the current legislators
or voters do so.
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ready convinced some jurisdictions to expand the right to vote. Other
cities and towns should follow suit.
B. Local Jurisdictions as “Test Tubes of Democracy”
Over eighty years ago, Justice Louis Brandeis famously referred
to the states as “laboratories of democracy” that can experiment with
different laws to see what works best. “[A] single courageous State
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”173
Yet although we have fifty states—fifty laboratories—we also have
tens of thousands of cities and towns that also make laws that affect
their citizens.174 Each of these municipalities also could enact local
laws to “try novel social and economic experiments,”175 such as on the
right to vote. If states are laboratories of democracy, then municipali-
ties are, in essence, “test tubes of democracy,” experimenting with
democratic processes on an even smaller scale.176
The prevailing notion of voting rights law is that “eligibility to
vote is defined in the first instance by state law, although the contours
of that state law are subject to a series of overriding federal con-
straints.”177 But local government law may also play a role. Municipal-
ities can expand voting rights in local elections if there are no explicit
state constitutional or legislative impediments and so long as local ju-
risdictions have the power of home rule.178 We must recognize the im-
173 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
174 See Richard Briffault, Home Rule and Local Political Innovation, 22 J.L. & POL. 1, 31
(2006) [hereinafter Briffault, Home Rule] (“[I]f the fifty states are laboratories for public policy
formation, then surely the 3,000 counties and 15,000 municipalities provide logarithmically more
opportunities for innovation, experimentation and reform. Thousands of local governments pro-
vide thousands of arenas for innovation and for testing the costs and benefits of those innova-
tions.”); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 346, 346 (1990) (“There are more than 82,000 local governments in the United
States . . . .”).
175 New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
176 See, e.g., Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1114 (2007) (“In the
sheer number of laboratories offered, local governments dwarf the mere 50 states: there are
15,000 municipalities and 3,000 counties, as well as 35,000 special-purpose districts.” (footnotes
omitted)); Robert C. Holmes, The Clash of Home Rule and Affordable Housing: The Mount
Laurel Story Continues, 12 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 325, 332 (2013) (“Local self-government also
promotes policy innovation and experimentation. Similar to federalism’s facilitation of state-
level innovation, local autonomy permits local governments to serve as ‘laboratories of democ-
racy’ and ‘to try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.’”
(quoting New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).
177 Pamela S. Karlan, Framing the Voting Rights Claims of Cognitively Impaired Individu-
als, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 917, 919 (2007).
178 See infra Sections III.C.1, III.C.2.
\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\85-4\GWN401.txt unknown Seq: 36  1-SEP-17 14:10
1074 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:1039
portance of local laws in defining and shaping the electorate, at least
for municipal elections. Moreover, these local rules can have a nation-
wide impact as they spread throughout the country.
Local laws are easier to pass than state or federal legislation. Lo-
cal ordinances typically are more “streamlined,” meaning that “there
is a greater possibility that more single-issue laws overall will be
passed via local governments than by higher levels of government.”179
As the Utah Supreme Court has recognized,
the history of our political institutions is founded in large
measure on the concept—at least in theory if not in prac-
tice—that the more local the unit of government is that can
deal with a political problem, the more effective and efficient
the exercise of power is likely to be.180
Local governments are more effective because they are closer to their
constituents.181 Moreover, localities often elect their officials in “non-
partisan” elections, which might temper the partisanship that infil-
trates state and federal lawmaking.182 In essence, passing a right-to-
vote ordinance at the local level is easier than through a statewide or
federal constitutional amendment or statutory change.
Local laws can spread throughout the country once other jurisdic-
tions see the new rules working well.183 Social movements may begin
after one locality adopts a reform to great success, causing other mu-
nicipalities to emulate the first mover. Justice Brandeis’s invocation of
the “laboratories of democracy” metaphor posits that states will adopt
the best ideas tested initially in one courageous state.184 Yet cities and
179 See Kellen Zale, Urban Development Legislation for Cities, by Cities, 67 ME. L. REV.
266, 267 (2015).
180 State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1121 (Utah 1980).
181 See Michael M. O’Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57 VAND. L. REV. 783, 860
(2004) (“Individual citizen voice grows as the size of the electorate shrinks; . . . if fifty state-level
‘laboratories of democracy’ are good, then the tens of thousands of laboratories provided by
local government might be even better.”).
182 See Karen I. Chang, Note, The Party’s Over: Establishing Nonpartisan Municipal Elec-
tions in New York City, 11 J.L. & POL’Y 579, 579 (2003) (“Today, a majority of the nation’s cities
utilize nonpartisan elections, and sixty of the seventy-five largest U.S. cities have elected their
mayors in nonpartisan elections.” (footnote omitted)); Nancy Northup, Note, Local Nonpartisan
Elections, Political Parties and the First Amendment, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1677, 1677 (1987)
(“Most local elections in America are nonpartisan.”). Of course, local consideration of election
rules could lead to an increase in the partisanship of local elections.
183 See Briffault, Home Rule, supra note 174, at 32 (noting that local experimentation en- R
tails few external costs but many external benefits in “providing new information about the
consequences of particular innovations”); see also supra Part I.
184 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Justice O’Connor, in discussing the women’s suffrage movement and the fact that Wyoming was
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towns may be even more important in being the first movers, particu-
larly for social issues.185 As Professor Diller explains:
City policy experimentation is a catalyst for change at the
state and national levels. From gay rights to the environment
to public health, cities and other forms of local government
are adopting new and innovative policies in the wake of inac-
tion by the higher levels of government.
. . . .
Cities have increasingly led in enacting new policies in a
wide variety of areas, including living-wage laws, workers’
rights, global warming reduction, public financing of cam-
paigns, trans fats regulation, affordable housing, universal
health care, environmental protection, gay rights, and smok-
ing prevention.186
Municipalities were the first governmental entities to pass laws on
these significant social issues, which then eventually spread to other
cities and states:
These examples illustrate a widespread pattern of policy in-
novation: a policy first embraced by a city proves itself man-
ageable and popular at the local level before percolating
“out” to other cities and “up” to the state level. Without the
possibility of city experimentation, these policies might have
never been embraced by other jurisdictions.187
The fight for expanded rights for gays and lesbians provides a
good example: although many local jurisdictions continued to discrim-
inate, the social movement that eventually led to the constitutional
recognition of same-sex marriage saw some initial successes through
local nondiscrimination ordinances.188
the first state to allow women to vote when it became a state in 1890, noted that, “Courts and
commentators frequently have recognized that the 50 States serve as laboratories for the devel-
opment of new social, economic, and political ideas.” FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788
(1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
185 See, e.g., Sims v. Besaw’s Cafe´, 997 P.2d 201, 213 n.3 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (en banc)
(noting that “municipalities tend to be the proving grounds—in terms of both need and public
acceptance—for nondiscrimination policies that later are adopted at state and national levels”).
186 Diller, supra note 176, at 1113–14, 1117–18 (footnotes omitted) (arguing for state courts R
to adopt a theory of “intrastate preemption that facilitates good-faith policy experimentation by
cities, while discouraging parochial and exclusionary municipal action”).
187 Id. at 1119.
188 See JAMES W. BUTTON ET AL., PRIVATE LIVES, PUBLIC CONFLICTS: BATTLES OVER GAY
RIGHTS IN AMERICAN COMMUNITIES 69 (1997) (noting that local nondiscrimination ordinances
applying to sexual orientation date to the 1970s); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-
Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 462 (2001) (“Success in baby
steps at the local level was a spur to the social movement, both by demonstrating to still-closeted
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Indeed, with respect to another election law issue—public financ-
ing of campaigns—cities have taken the lead. Although New York
City’s successful public financing scheme is the most prominent exam-
ple,189 smaller jurisdictions such as Boulder, Colorado, and Tucson,
Arizona, also have local public financing regimes for their city elec-
tions.190 Their successes have encouraged other cities to move forward
with their own innovations.191 In 2014, Montgomery County, Mary-
land, adopted public financing rules for local campaigns.192 In 2015,
Seattle voters adopted an innovative campaign finance system to use
“democracy vouchers,” in which the city mails voters four vouchers
worth $25 each for the voter to assign to candidates for local office
who agree to various campaign finance limitations.193 Advocates for
campaign finance reform are eagerly watching Seattle’s experiment to
see if they want to seek its adoption in other cities.
The movement for expanded voting rights also can begin at the
local level and radiate out to other cities and then states in a “trickle
gay people that the movement could be successful and by illustrating how far gay people had to
go to achieve full legal equality.”); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding
that the right to marry for same-sex couples is a fundamental constitutional right). Local back-
lash against gays and lesbians followed the initial successes, which may have slowed the move-
ment toward recognition of same-sex marriage. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge Jr., Backlash
Politics: How Constitutional Litigation Has Advanced Marriage Equality in the United States, 93
B.U. L. REV. 275, 281 (2013) (“When Hawaii’s supreme court suggested that gay marriage might
be recognized in that state, there was a powerful local backlash and a ferocious national one that
set back the marriage equality movement in many respects.”).
189 See Spencer Overton, Matching Political Contributions, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1694, 1697
(2012) (noting that “candidates in New York City (the only American jurisdiction with six-to-
one multiple matching funds) collect over half of their money from contributors who give $250
or less”).
190 See STEVEN M. LEVIN, CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, KEEPING IT CLEAN: PUBLIC
FINANCING IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS 116–18 (2006), http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/kmayer/466/
Keeping_It_Clean.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/20170107010513/http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/
kmayer/466/Keeping_It_Clean.pdf] (listing twelve jurisdictions with public financing systems for
local elections as of 2006).
191 See Briffault, Home Rule, supra note 174, at 32 (“We know far more about the worka- R
bility, benefits, and costs of [instant runoff voting] and public funding of election campaigns as a
result of the innovative actions of cities like San Francisco, Tucson, Los Angeles, and New
York.”).
192 See Bill Turque, Montgomery Council Approves Plan for Public Finance of Local Cam-
paigns, WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/mont
gomery-council-approves-plan-for-public-finance-of-local-campaigns/2014/09/30/b3e2b15c-482d-
11e4-b72e-d60a9229cc10_story.html.
193 See SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE §§ 2.04.600–2.04.690 (2017), https://www.muni
code.com/library/wa/seattle/codes/municipal_code?nodeId=TIT2EL_CH2.04ELCACO_SUB
CHAPTER_VIIIHOELSE; Bob Young, ‘Democracy Vouchers’ Win in Seattle; First in Country,
SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 4, 2015, 6:20 AM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/demo
cracy-vouchers/.
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across” and “trickle up” mechanism. For instance, many Americans
disagree with existing policies that disenfranchise felons who have
completed their sentences.194 Advocates could look to local jurisdic-
tions to reform the law. Successes at the local level, with felons voting
in municipal elections without any issues, will then arm supporters
with better evidence on the positive aspects of felon re-enfranchise-
ment and will help to bolster democratic representation.195 Smaller
victories at the municipal level can breed broader wins city by city and
state by state. As advocates for a Municipal Right to Vote ordinance
explain:
Municipal reform is often overlooked, but it can be one of
the most efficient and potent methods of fostering political
change. The Municipal Right to Vote Initiative seeks to have
cities call for a constitutional right to vote and to pledge to
enact ordinances and charter changes in the spirit of that
proposed amendment, thereby building both political sup-
port for an amendment and showcasing what it would mean
for protecting and expanding suffrage.196
Municipalities should pass an ordinance on voting rights that expands
the electorate for local elections to those who have a direct, personal
stake in the outcome.
Of course, local political actors could alter voting rules to en-
trench themselves in power, which is a more concerning use of local
voting rights.197 Local politicians could enact ordinances that reduce
voting opportunities or exclude certain groups of voters. Yet the fact
that the federal and state constitutions provide a baseline for voting
rights protection tempers that concern. A local jurisdiction cannot
deny the right to vote to anyone who is a citizen of the United States,
194 See John Ghaelian, Restoring the Vote: Former Felons, International Law, and the Eighth
Amendment, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 757, 780 (2013) (“Public opinion polling conducted on
the matter also demonstrates a national consensus against felon disenfranchisement.”); Jeff
Manza et al., Public Attitudes Toward Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 68 PUB.
OPINION Q. 275, 280–81 (2004), http://as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/3858/Public_Attitudes_Towards_
Felon_Disenfranchisement_Laws_in_the_US.pdf; Matt Ferner, Americans Don’t Think Ex-Of-
fenders Should Lose Their Right to Vote, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 26, 2016, 6:41 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ex-convict-voting-rights_us_571fb9d5e4b0b49df6a95746.
195 See Lynn Eisenberg, Note, States as Laboratories for Federal Reform: Case Studies in
Felon Disenfranchisement Law, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 539, 576 (2012) (noting that
“the ‘laboratories of democracy’ approach can and has applied to the expansion of voting
rights,” including through the repeal of felon disenfranchisement rules).
196 Usman Ahmed et al., A Municipal Right to Vote, NAT’L CIVIC REV., Summer 2008, at
52, 52, http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/60453/215_ftp.pdf?sequence=1.
197 See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of
the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 647 (1998); Schleicher, supra note 172, at 247. R
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a resident of the state and locality, at least eighteen years old, and not
mentally incompetent.198 In addition, under the U.S. Constitution, mu-
nicipalities may not discriminate on the basis of sex, race, or other
protected characteristics,199 and local jurisdictions also may not limit
the electorate by espousing a narrow view of who they believe has an
actual stake in the outcome.200 Federal and state statutes also prevent
discrimination in voting.201 Thus, if legislating directly on who may
vote, local jurisdictions can go nowhere besides up, expanding voter
access.
With greater attention to voting rules, however, municipalities
also could enact indirect measures to restrict voting. Jurisdictions
could, for example, legislate on where to place precincts, reduce the
number of machines at certain polling sites, or make redistricting deci-
sions that effectively exclude some people from the relevant jurisdic-
tion.202 Although not about voter qualifications per se, these rules
could effectively hamper the right to vote for some people. In fact, in
the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County v.
Holder203 invalidating a provision of the Voting Rights Act, many
(typically Republican-controlled) jurisdictions have passed laws that
have the goal, or at least effect, of disenfranchising minority voters.204
For this reason, courts should train a more skeptical eye on measures
198 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; Douglas, supra note 6, at 101–05 (highlighting state R
constitutional rules for voter eligibility); see also Michael T. Morley, Remedial Equilibration and
the Right to Vote Under Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 279, 283
(pointing to Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment as delineating the scope of the constitu-
tional protection for the right to vote); Franita Tolson, The Constitutional Structure of Voting
Rights Enforcement, 89 WASH. L. REV. 379, 384–85 (2014) (arguing for an expansive understand-
ing of Congress’s authority to regulate the right to vote under the Fourteenth Amendment).
199 See Douglas, supra note 7, at 151. R
200 Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 629, 632 (1969).
201 See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012) (Federal Voting Rights Act); CAL. ELEC. CODE
§§ 14025–14032 (West 2003) (California Voting Rights Act).
202 See, e.g., Arizona Democrats Say Cost-Saving Resulted in Voter Suppression, WTKR
(March 23, 2016, 3:11 PM), http://wtkr.com/2016/03/23/arizona-democrats-say-cost-saving-re
sulted-in-voter-suppression/ (“Liberal activists are demanding an investigation into what they
see as possible voter suppression as a result of Maricopa County officials’ decision to reduce the
number of polling stations as a cost-saving measure.”).
203 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
204 See Harry Baumgarten & Jacob Zionce, Shelby County v. Holder’s Biggest and Most
Harmful Impact May Be on Our Nation’s Smallest Towns, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. (June 20,
2016), http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/news/blog/shelby-county-v-holder-s-biggest-and-
most-harmful-impact-may-be-our-nation-s-smallest; Democracy Diminished: State and Local
Threats to Voting Post-Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC.
FUND (June 9, 2016), http://www.naacpldf.org/publication/democracy-diminished-state-and-local
-threats-voting-post-shelby-county-alabama-v-holder.
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that restrict the right to vote. From a normative perspective, we should
encourage more, not less, voter participation as a means of creating a
better functioning and more representative democracy. The more peo-
ple who participate, the more likely the winning candidate actually
will reflect the desires of the majority of the population, thereby im-
proving the representative’s legitimacy. Thus, enfranchising additional
people should not come with a license to pass laws that restrict voting
rights. In contrast, jurisdictions should freely experiment with laws
that expand voter access in a nondiscriminatory way. That is, measures
that expand the right to vote are qualitatively different from rules that
(directly or indirectly) restrict democratic participation, so local gov-
erning bodies and courts should treat the two kinds of measures
differently.
But what about laws that expand voter access for some at the
expense of others? For instance, a local rule placing more precincts in
one part of town to assist voters in those neighborhoods might hurt
voters in another part of town that now has fewer precincts. The ex-
pand/restrict dichotomy for voting rights may not always break down
into neat categories. Although some rules might have differing effects,
the key question policymakers should ask is whether, as a whole, the
primary purpose or effect is to expand voting rights in a nondiscrimi-
natory way. This formulation is similar to the concept of retrogres-
sion205: if the status quo is the baseline, then does the new local rule
make voters, in the aggregate, better or worse off in a nondiscrimina-
tory manner? Courts could also use a primary purpose or effect test to
decide whether the local rule is mostly expansive or restrictive toward
voting rights, which will direct the level of deference.206 Furthermore,
all of the various constitutional and legislative backstops to voting dis-
crimination still apply. Thus, when considering local legislative moti-
vations, the key question is whether the local jurisdiction is, as a
whole, attempting to expand voting rights in a nondiscriminatory and
noninvidious manner.
Of course, states that oppose these local voter expansions could
pass state laws that expressly preempt local action. But states should
not do so for all of the policy reasons discussed above: municipalities
205 See 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a) (prohibiting voting rules that have “the purpose [or] the effect
of denying or abridging the right to vote” to minorities); Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and
Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174, 217 (2007) (explaining the “new retro-
gression” standard of the Voting Rights Act).
206 See infra Section III.C.3 (discussing the level of deference a court should give to local
voting rules); cf. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 910, 917 (1995) (applying a “predominant,
overriding factor” analysis to the purpose inquiry for a claim of racial gerrymandering).
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should have the power to dictate the scope of their own governmental
structures and electorate, and localities should experiment and inno-
vate with their voting rules. If a state legislature insists on preempting
local voting laws, however, then the solution is to elect different state
representatives who will support local democracy.
Even in states in which local jurisdictions do not have the legal
authority to expand voting rights—meaning that a local ordinance
cannot have any actual legal effect—a municipal statement on the
right to vote can still spur the debate and send a signal to the legisla-
ture. Amherst, Massachusetts, for example, has passed several ordi-
nances on noncitizen voting that cannot go into effect without the
state legislature’s approval.207 Yet Amherst’s enactments are not in
vain. Simply declaring the importance of the constitutional right to
vote and attempting to expand the franchise creates an environment
in which legislators, and the general public, actively debate these is-
sues. Social change can succeed through grassroots organization,
meaning that local jurisdictions are well suited to act as the catalyst
for this issue. The statement can still have an impact even if it does not
have the force of law.
Every city or town should pass a resolution affirming the impor-
tance of the right to vote. Further, jurisdictions should expand the
right to vote to include sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds, noncitizens
(who are lawful permanent residents), nonresident property owners,
felons who have completed their sentences, or any other group who
currently may not vote but, the polity believes, has a sufficient nexus
to the local community and a stake in local governance and policy.
Denying voting rights to these individuals should result from consid-
ered judgment instead of simply maintaining the status quo through
inertia. Once jurisdictions carefully examine the experience of the few
courageous cities that have taken the lead, they will recognize the pol-
icy wisdom of expanding the franchise.
C. Law
Four potential hurdles could hamper local expansion of the right
to vote. None are insurmountable, but they all require careful thought
for advocates of local voting rights.
First, some state constitutions or legislation set specific voter
qualifications and couch them as restrictions, meaning that local gov-
207 See Kini, supra note 121, at 271 n.1. R
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ernments may not go beyond these substantive provisions.208 In es-
sence, mandatory state law might preempt local voting rules. States
with these rules should amend their constitutions or laws to allow lo-
cal governments to set different standards for local elections. Second,
some state constitutions or statutes do not grant municipalities home
rule, or local power, over local elections. These states should change
their home rule doctrine. Third, court challenges based on state law
preemption or lack of home rule power could derail local move-
ments.209 Given that municipalities are continuing to enact right-to-
vote rules that expand voter access, a lawsuit seeking to invalidate one
of these laws is inevitable, either through direct litigation or within the
context of a disputed election. Courts therefore must have the proper
tools and tests ready to decide these cases. If any room exists under
state constitutional or statutory law to give cities and towns authority
to expand voter qualifications for their own elections, then courts
should defer to these local bodies in their own explication of local
democracy. Finally, administrators must solve the practical problem of
running an election where some voters may vote for certain offices
(local races) but not others (national or state elections). Voting tech-
nology provides a fairly easy solution to this concern.
The ability to expand voting rights at the local level will depend
on the nature of existing state law. Some states must pass a constitu-
tional amendment or legislative act to remove specific restrictions on
expanding voter access. In other states, the legislature must change
the existing home rule doctrine.210 Strong policy reasons support both
reforms. But many states do not have specific language on voter quali-
fications or home rule. In those states, local jurisdictions should enact
ordinances expanding the electorate for local elections. In a court
challenge, judges should defer to the local laws under a theory of rep-
resentation that allows the local government to choose for itself what
kind of participatory democracy it wants for its own elections.
208 A White Paper from Generation Citizen, a nonprofit advocacy group seeking to lower
the voting age, deftly explains the difference between a “grant” of the right to vote and a “re-
striction”: “The Ohio Constitution, for example, says ‘Every citizen of the United States, of the
age of eighteen years . . . is entitled to vote at all elections.’ This phrase can be interpreted two
ways: either (1) the right to vote is given exclusively to citizens over the age of 18 [a restriction],
or (2) while those over 18 cannot be denied the right to vote, voting rights could be granted on a
discretionary basis to those under 18 [a grant].” See Generation Citizen, supra note 86, at 17 R
(ellipsis in original).
209 See Briffault, Home Rule, supra note 174, at 3. R
210 The Appendix lists, in tabular form, the potential hurdles to local voting rights laws in
each state.
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1. State Constitutional or Legislative Rules on
Voter Qualifications
Some state constitutions or statutes set maximum voter qualifica-
tions, leaving no room for local jurisdictions to change these qualifica-
tions for local elections.211 In essence, state law explicitly preempts
local rules that differ. In these states, advocates of local expansion of
voting rights must amend the constitution or change state law using
the policy arguments discussed above.212
For instance, a state constitution might explicitly set the voting
age at eighteen. The Texas Constitution provides, “The following clas-
ses of persons shall not be allowed to vote in this State: (1) persons
under 18 years of age.”213 Similarly, Virginia’s constitution states,
“Each voter shall be a citizen of the United States, shall be eighteen
years of age, shall fulfill the residence requirements set forth in this
section, and shall be registered to vote pursuant to this article.”214
Given the mandatory word “shall,” little wiggle room exists within this
provision for a local jurisdiction to lower the voting age or expand
voting to noncitizens or nonresidents. Advocates of local voting rules
in these states must seek to amend the constitution.
But many state constitutions are not so restrictive—at least not
explicitly. Just like the Federal Constitution, most state constitutions
simply provide a floor for voter qualifications.215 They dictate criteria
like citizenship and age, but they do not forbid further expansion.216
For instance, the Kentucky Constitution provides, “Every citizen of
the United States of the age of eighteen years who has resided in the
state one year, and in the county six months, and the precinct in which
he offers to vote sixty days next preceding the election, shall be a
voter in said precinct.”217 That is, although the state constitution sets
the voting age at eighteen, nothing in this provision prevents a local
government from issuing a more expansive rule and lowering the vot-
ing age for its own elections. Despite listing several qualifications, the
constitution does not say that only citizens who have reached age
211 These states are Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Loui-
siana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. See infra Appendix.
212 See supra Section III.A.
213 TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1(a)(1).
214 VA. CONST. art. II, § 1.
215 See Douglas, supra note 6, at 95. R
216 See id. at 101–03.
217 KY. CONST. § 145.
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eighteen are qualified to vote in all elections.218 Those who are eigh-
teen may vote in state elections, but the language does not explicitly
preempt local jurisdictions from lowering that age for local elections
because it does not couch the voter qualifications as restrictions. Colo-
rado’s constitution, which says, “Every citizen of the United States
who has attained the age of eighteen years, has resided in this state for
such time as may be prescribed by law, and has been duly registered
as a voter if required by law shall be qualified to vote at all elections,”
is another example of a grant.219 The phrases “has attained,” “has re-
sided,” and “has been duly registered” open the door to local expan-
sions—they stipulate certain criteria to define the state’s electorate
but do not explicitly limit voting only to those who have satisfied these
requirements.220
State legislation also varies in listing voter qualifications as either
a floor or a ceiling. Illinois law is an example of a floor, allowing local
jurisdictions to go beyond the statewide rules: “Every person . . . who
is a citizen of the United States, of the age of 18 or more years is
entitled to vote at such election for all offices and on all proposi-
tions.”221 An Illinois resident “is entitled” to vote in state elections if
he or she meets the voter qualification requirements, but the textual
formulation of the statute does not limit local jurisdictions from ex-
panding those rules for local elections; other individuals also may be
“entitled” to vote in local elections if the local rules so allow. In con-
trast, Minnesota law requires certain characteristics of all voters:
“[A]n individual who meets the following requirements at the time of
an election is eligible to vote. The individual must: (1) be 18 years of
age or older; (2) be a citizen of the United States; and (3) maintain
residence in Minnesota for 20 days immediately preceding the elec-
tion.”222 The word “must,” in describing the voter qualifications, dic-
tates these requirements for all voters in all elections in the state,
placing a ceiling on localities that want to pass a more expansive rule.
Advocates of local expansion must convince the state legislature to
amend the law. Again, the policy arguments listed above—the history
218 In this context, courts should not necessarily apply the statutory construction expressio
unius est exclusio alterius—or the inclusion of some things means the exclusion of others—under
a substantive theory of democracy that favors voter inclusion. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, The
Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69, 109–10 (2009).
219 COLO. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (LEXIS, LexisNexis through 2016 legislative session).
220 See Generation Citizen, supra note 86, at 17. R
221 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-1 (2016), http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs4.asp?DocName
=001000050HArt%2E+3&ActID=170&ChapterID=3&SeqStart=11300000&SeqEnd=12200000.
222 MINN. STAT. § 201.014 (2016).
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of many voter expansions occurring at the local level, the fact of local
control over elections, and a recognition that local governmental enti-
ties should be able to choose their own theory of democracy—should
assist reform advocates in seeking to change the law.
In sum, many states list voter qualifications in their constitutions
and statutes as “grants” (e.g., anyone who is eighteen may vote in
state elections), as opposed to “restrictions” (e.g., one may not vote
unless they are eighteen). Language that couches voting rights as a
grant opens the door to local laws that go beyond these requirements
for their own elections. States that have restrictions should reform
their laws. In states that do not substantively and specifically limit lo-
cal rules on the right to vote, however, municipalities should enact
local voting laws to expand the franchise. As discussed below, courts
should construe the provisions to allow for local voting laws where
possible and should defer to local expansions of the franchise.
2. Home Rule
Home rule refers to the extent to which a state allows local juris-
dictions to have local control.223 With home rule, municipalities can
enact laws that affect their cities or towns, such as voter qualifications
for local elections. If a state constitution or statute has not granted
municipalities legal power through home rule, however, then local ju-
risdictions may not act independently of the state legislature.
Initially, cities and towns did not have much authority to enact
their own laws. Under Dillon’s Rule, local jurisdictions could pass
only laws directly related to their municipal charter or laws that the
state explicitly allowed, because “municipalities possessed only those
powers indispensable to the purposes of their incorporation as well as
any others expressly bestowed upon them by the state.”224
But states and localities became frustrated with the restrictive na-
ture of Dillon’s Rule, leading states to pass home rule provisions that
gave local jurisdictions much broader authority to enact substantive
rules.225 Early proponents perceived home rule as a means to prevent
223 Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the
Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643, 645 (1964).
224 Diller, supra note 176, at 1122–23 (citing 1 JOHN F. DILLON, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL R
CORPORATIONS § 9b, at 93 (2d ed. 1873) (“[Municipalities] possess no powers or faculties not
conferred upon them, either expressly or by fair implication, by the law which creates
them . . . .”)); see Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 177–79 (1907) (adopting Dillon’s
Rule).
225 See Diller, supra note 176, at 1124 (discussing the emergence of home rule “at the end R
of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries”).
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the centralized state government from interfering in local affairs.226
The doctrine recognizes that local governments should have the
power “to organize the local political entity, to establish its governing
organs, their selection, their powers and their limits.”227
Traditional home rule doctrine classifies home rule provisions as
either “imperio,” which gives localities both the power to enact local
rules and immunity from having to follow inconsistent state laws, or
“legislative,” which provides the power to localities but not the guar-
antee against state preemption.228 Yet most courts considering local
election laws have not drawn this distinction at all.229 Instead, they
have tended to uphold local authority to enact local election rules re-
gardless of whether the home rule doctrine comes from the state con-
stitution or state statute and regardless of whether the home rule
power is of the imperio or legislative form.230 As Professor Richard
Briffault notes, “What really seems to matter is the judicial recogni-
tion that local control of local governance or politics is both of central
importance to the local self-determination that is home rule while si-
multaneously posing little or no threat or cost to the localities or the
state beyond local borders.”231
The use of home rule authorization has not been consistent
throughout the country, and “a patchwork of approaches to local au-
thority” exists among the states.232 For example, California grants
226 See, e.g., RODNEY L. MOTT, HOME RULE FOR AMERICA’S CITIES 7 (1949) (“One of the
major objectives of home rule is to prevent legislative interference with local government. Dur-
ing a large part of the nineteenth century, under the dominant theory of legislative supremacy,
cities were considered to be merely creatures of the state legislature. . . . Cities were completely
subservient to legislative vagaries and whims . . . . Legislative interference with cities tends to
turn state legislatures into spasmodic city councils. Home rule, as a device for returning local
business to the city, is the obvious remedy for these evils.”). For an account of the home rule
movement that suggests the story is more complicated and entailed both grants and limits on
local power, see David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255 (2003).
227 City of La Grande v. Pub. Employes Ret. Bd., 586 P.2d 765, 767–68 (Or. 1978) (en
banc).
228 See Briffault, Home Rule, supra note 174, at 19. See generally LYNN A. BAKER, CLAY- R
TON P. GILLETTE & DAVID SCHLEICHER, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (5th ed. 2015); RICHARD
BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERN-
MENT LAW (7th ed. 2009).
229 See Briffault, Home Rule, supra note 174, at 19. R
230 See id.
231 Id.
232 See Diller, supra note 176, at 1126. Indeed, some states grant home rule to counties but R
not cities, and vice versa. See Paul A. Diller, The City and the Private Right of Action, 64 STAN.
L. REV. 1109, 1130 (2012) (noting that “within a state, home rule may vary between city and
county—with one having more power than the other—as well as among different cities and
among different counties”).
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fairly broad home rule power to its cities and towns, while Massachu-
setts does not.233 California’s constitution provides that municipalities
“may make and enforce all ordinances and regulations in respect to
municipal affairs.”234 The California Constitution goes on to list ex-
plicitly “city elections” as a permissible subject of city charters.235
Thus, San Francisco’s recent debate about lowering the voting age to
sixteen falls directly within the grant of home rule that the state’s con-
stitution provides.236 By contrast, Massachusetts law requires the state
legislature to approve any local voting rules.237
In some states, legislation explicitly grants authority to local juris-
dictions to enact laws pertaining to local elections. Maryland’s elec-
tion code, for example, provides that except for Baltimore, state
election law does not bind towns and cities if they choose to enact
their own election rules; this is the very authority that Takoma Park
and Hyattsville invoked to lower the voting age for their city elec-
tions.238 Similarly, Missouri law gives any city with a population over
400,000 the right to regulate its own elections.239 Thus, Kansas City,
the only Missouri city with a population that high, may enact rules for
its local elections that go beyond state voter qualifications.240
233 For a comprehensive discussion of the home rule potential to lower the voting age in
every state, see Generation Citizen, supra note 86. See also infra Appendix. R
234 CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5(a).
235 Id. § 5(b).
236 Home rule authorization likely exists for local laws to lower the voting age in Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Illinois, Maryland, Missouri (only Kansas City), New Jersey, New Mexico,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Washington, Washington, D.C., and Wisconsin.
In other states, an explicit lack of home rule authority either forbids local voting laws or is not
clear. See infra Appendix; see also Generation Citizen, supra note 86, at 19–21. Several states R
have statutes that contemplate local laws that allow nonresidents to vote in municipal elections,
thereby providing home rule authority for this category of voter expansion. See supra note 141 R
and accompanying text. In addition, states may vary in their home rule authorization for cities
versus counties. See Diller, supra note 232, at 1130. R
237 MASS CONST. amend. art. LXXXIX, § 8; MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 43B (LexisNexis 2016).
238 MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 2-202(a) (LexisNexis 2016) (“Except for the City of Bal-
timore, the provisions of this section do not apply to a municipal corporation in the State in
which the municipal or charter elections are regulated by the public local laws of the State or the
charter of the municipal corporation.”); see supra Section II.A.
239 MO. REV. STAT. § 122.650 (2016) (“Full power and authority are hereby conferred on
every city in this state which now has, or may hereafter have, more than four hundred thousand
inhabitants, to provide for and regulate all elections for offices of and under such city and for the
nomination of candidates for such offices; and such provision for and regulation of such elections
may be effected either by charter provisions therefor adopted by the people of such city accord-
ing to law, or ordinances therefor duly enacted, or by the people thereof under the power of
initiative, if any, reserved in the charter of such city.”).
240 See QuickFacts: Kansas City city, Missouri, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.
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On the other end of the spectrum, some states expressly prohibit
municipal action on local elections. For instance, Connecticut’s home
rule provision, which grants cities and towns the authority to pass lo-
cal laws, contains an explicit exception for local rules about elections:
No provision of this chapter shall be deemed to empower
any municipality . . . to adopt a charter, charter amendments
or home rule ordinance amendments which shall affect mat-
ters concerning qualification and admission of electors; du-
ties and responsibilities of registrars of voters; duties and
responsibilities of town clerks with respect to electors, voting
and elections; forfeiture of electoral rights and restoration of
the same; absentee voting; conduct of and procedures at
elections; hours of voting; canvass of electors; preliminary,
final and supplementary registry lists; warning of elections;
election officials and their duties and responsibilities; elec-
tion canvass and returns; election contests; corrupt practices;
prohibited acts with respect to elections; nomination of can-
didates; adoption and amendment of party rules; primaries;
and political parties and enrollment therein.241
A local rule expanding the franchise in Connecticut is therefore inva-
lid under this provision. Proponents of local voting rights must con-
vince the Connecticut legislature to repeal the law and broaden home
rule power to include local election rules.
Some state laws, however, are not as explicit as Connecticut’s.
For instance, Indiana’s home rule statute allows local governments to
pass local laws, except if the conduct “is regulated by a state
agency.”242 Of course, the Indiana Secretary of State’s Office is a
“state agency” that regulates elections. Yet the Secretary of State does
not promulgate voter qualifications. Moreover, the home rule provi-
sion is not explicit in making an exception to home rule power if a
municipality dictates its own voter qualifications for its own local elec-
tions. Absent this specificity, a court should construe the home rule
exception narrowly and the local jurisdiction’s power to decide who
constitutes its own electorate broadly. As Hans Linde, the influential
Oregon Supreme Court Justice, noted, local governments have the au-
thority to “decide upon the organization of their government and the
scope of its powers”243—which, at its most basic and fundamental
gov/quickfacts/table/PST045216/2938000,2036000,2965000,00 [https://perma.cc/E46G-DJTA]
(last visited May 30, 2017).
241 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-192a (West 2008).
242 IND. CODE § 36-1-3-8(7) (2016).
243 City of La Grande v. Pub. Employes Ret. Bd., 576 P.2d 1204, 1208 (1978) (en banc).
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level, should also include the power to decide whether to go beyond
the minimum national standards in defining who is part of the local
electorate.
3. Judicial Interpretation of Local Laws Expanding the Franchise
A federal constitutional challenge to a local ordinance that ex-
pands voter access will likely fail. The Constitution sets a minimum
standard for voting rights under the Equal Protection Clause and vari-
ous other amendments that are specific to voting,244 but it does not say
that states or localities are prohibited from going above that floor. A
lawsuit that invokes a state constitution or statute, however, presents
more difficulties for advocates of local voting laws. The key questions
will be whether the state’s law contains voter qualification limits that
preempt local action and whether the state has granted municipalities
home rule to enact local legislation, as discussed above. In deciding
these disputes, an overarching principle should guide courts: if there is
any room for interpretation, local laws that expand the franchise de-
serve deference, while local laws that restrict the franchise do not.
a. Federal Constitutional Challenges
Litigants who seek to invalidate a local law that expands the right
to vote will likely fail when invoking the U.S. Constitution.245 The
Constitution sets a baseline for voter qualifications, but there is noth-
ing to suggest that local jurisdictions cannot expand beyond these
rules. The Constitution first looks to state law for substantive voter
qualifications, saying that eligible voters for Congress are those indi-
viduals who may vote for the state legislature.246 In addition, states
and localities may not deny the right to vote to citizens on the basis of
race,247 sex,248 inability to pay a poll tax,249 or age if above eighteen.250
The bulk of federal constitutional protection for the right to vote
comes from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.251
244 See U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI.
245 Local governments are subject to the one person, one vote rule that requires equal
population among districts, see Avery v. Midland Cty., 390 U.S. 474, 484–85 (1968), but expan-
sions of the right to vote to certain groups are unlikely to implicate one person, one vote con-
cerns because a local election affects only that municipality and not other parts of the state. The
value of everyone’s vote is the same within that jurisdiction.
246 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; id. amend. XVII.
247 Id. amend. XV.
248 Id. amend. XIX.
249 Id. amend. XXIV.
250 Id. amend. XXVI.
251 See id. amend. XIV.
\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\85-4\GWN401.txt unknown Seq: 51  1-SEP-17 14:10
2017] THE RIGHT TO VOTE UNDER LOCAL LAW 1089
As the Supreme Court has explained, “once the franchise is granted to
the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”252 States
must grant the right to vote to all eligible voters on equal terms. Yet in
recent years, the Court has weakened federal constitutional protection
for the right to vote in a series of cases that have adopted a balancing
test for analyzing restrictions on the franchise.253 Regardless of this
weaker judicial protection, however, a federal floor exists under which
states and municipalities may not legislate.
But nothing in the text of the Constitution or the Supreme
Court’s caselaw prohibits a local jurisdiction from adopting more ex-
pansive voting rights. The Twenty-Sixth Amendment stipulates that
states may not deny the right to vote to anyone aged eighteen or
older, but it says nothing about lowering the voting age to sixteen or
seventeen. A local law lowering the voting age is more expansive than
the rule within the U.S. Constitution. As a district court explained, the
Twenty-Sixth Amendment “provides that the right to vote cannot be
denied on the basis of age to persons age eighteen or over, but it does
not prohibit the states from setting a lower voting age.”254
Similarly, although the Constitution limits some forms of political
participation to citizens—such as holding federal elected office255—it
does not include this qualification for voting. The U.S. Supreme Court
has recognized that “citizenship has not in all cases been made a con-
dition precedent to the enjoyment of the right of suffrage.”256 The
Court also has noted that, although the Constitution permits states to
enact felon disenfranchisement laws, it does not require these restric-
tions, meaning that a state or locality could choose to allow felons to
vote.257 Indeed, several states have re-enfranchised felons recently.258
252 Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966).
253 See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,
434 (1992); Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 189–90 (2008) (Stevens, J.); see
also Joshua A. Douglas, (Mis)trusting States to Run Elections, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 553, 558
(2015) (criticizing the Court’s undue deference to state interests in voting cases).
254 Day v. Robinwood W. Cmty. Improvement Dist., 693 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1007 n.12 (E.D.
Mo. 2010).
255 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (qualification of Representatives); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3
(qualification of Senators); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (qualification of President).
256 Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 177 (1874); see also Kini, supra note 121, at R
278 (advocating for local laws enfranchising noncitizens and noting that “a close examination of
the Constitution and Supreme Court precedent on this issue suggests that any federal constitu-
tional challenge to noncitizen voting would likely fail”); Raskin, supra note 133, at 1421 (explain- R
ing why noncitizen voting would not violate “principles of republicanism and one person-one
vote, the various suffrage amendments, and the Naturalization Clause” (footnotes omitted)).
257 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54–56 (1974).
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A claim of vote dilution under the Equal Protection Clause is the
other potential federal constitutional challenge to a local voting rule,
particularly if a jurisdiction allows nonresidents to vote. The theory is
that nonresident voters will “dilute” the strength of the votes of those
who reside in the jurisdiction and have a true stake in local affairs.259
But courts have generally rejected these challenges using deferential
rational basis review once the cities demonstrated that the nonresi-
dent voters had a “substantial interest” in the election.260 Therefore,
vote dilution challenges are unlikely to succeed if the local jurisdiction
has rationally decided that the new nonresident voters subject to the
expansion have a sufficient stake in the city’s governance.261
In addition, expanding voting rights in some localities but not
others does not present a Bush v. Gore262 Equal Protection Clause
problem—that “[h]aving once granted the right to vote on equal
terms, the State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment,
value one person’s vote over that of another.”263 There is no Bush v.
Gore concern because, in a locality that expands voting rights, all vot-
ers are still treated the same.264 The rules apply only to local elections
258 See, e.g., Dave Boyer, McAuliffe Begins to Grant Voting Rights for Convicted Felons
Individually After Court Ruling, WASH. TIMES (July 22, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2016/jul/22/virginia-supreme-court-overturns-terry-mcauliffes-/; Megan Morris, Former
Felons in Maryland Now Have Right to Vote, USA TODAY (Apr. 22, 2016, 4:05 PM), http://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/2016/04/22/former-felons-maryland-now-
have-right-vote/83400610/; Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Erik Eckholm, Virginia Governor Restores
Voting Rights to Felons, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/23/us/gov-
ernor-terry-mcauliffe-virginia-voting-rights-convicted-felons.html.
259 See Briffault, supra note 10, at 399 (“The enfranchisement of those without some stake R
in the community would reduce the voice of community members in their own local affairs,
interfere with their efforts to assure that their local government is responsive and accountable to
their interests, and, ultimately, erode their ability to govern themselves.”). See generally Amanda
Mayo, Comment, Nonresident Vote Dilution Claims: Rational Basis or Strict Scrutiny Review?, 83
U. CHI. L. REV. 2213 (2016) (analyzing “the ways in which courts address . . . nonresident vote
dilution claims”).
260 See Mayo, supra note 259, at 2236–40 (collecting cases). A “substantial interest” will R
often relate to local tax policy or school board issues.
261 See id. at 2241 (arguing that courts should consider “whether the border creating a resi-
dent/nonresident distinction artificially separates a unified political community”); see also Brif-
fault, supra note 10, at 400 (“The expanded electorate cases indicate that the states will be given R
considerable discretion to extend the franchise to groups affected by a local government but not
constitutionally entitled to vote in local elections. Such state decisions will be subject, however,
to judicial review to protect the interest in local self-government of those residents most affected
by the dilution that would result from the enfranchisement of those with a much smaller local
stake.”).
262 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
263 Id. at 104–05.
264 The biggest Bush v. Gore concern might come from a locality that expands voting rights
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and everyone’s vote is equal within that locality. That is, within each
governmental unit that holds elections for its officials, each vote has
the same value as every other vote.
In sum, a court will likely dismiss a federal constitutional chal-
lenge to a local rule that expands voter access; nothing in federal law
prevents states and localities, as laboratories and test tubes of democ-
racy, from experimenting with right-to-vote provisions that grant
greater access to the ballot.
b. State Constitutional or Statutory Challenges
Whether local rules on voting rights violate state constitutions or
statutes presents a more serious question. A court facing a challenge
to a local voting rights ordinance should engage in a two-part inquiry.
First, does anything in the state constitution or state legislation explic-
itly forbid the local jurisdiction from expanding the franchise, either
through voter qualification criteria or through a lack of home rule
power? A court must discern whether the state constitution or legisla-
tion has spoken directly on the maximum qualifications for voters or
on the authority of local jurisdictions to pass rules for their own elec-
tions. Put differently, does a state voter qualification law explicitly
preempt local laws? And does the grant of home rule authority specif-
ically exempt local jurisdictions from passing their own voting rules?
Second, assuming there is any room for a local jurisdiction to act,
then a court should give deference to the municipal law if it expands
the franchise. Municipalities have their own democratic structures and
should dictate who may participate in their democratic processes.265
Local elections are particularly important because they are the closest
form of democracy to the people and have the greatest effects on how
individuals order their daily lives. Ultimately, courts should construe
state constitutions, state legislation, and home rule provisions to allow
local jurisdictions to pass rules that are more inclusive of voting rights.
If the state constitution or legislation describes a voter qualifica-
tion as an explicit restriction, then a local jurisdiction may not expand
for nonresident property owners, especially if the number of votes is tied to the amount or value
of the property owned in the locality. In that instance, challengers may have a stronger argument
that expanding the right to vote for nonresident property owners treats individuals unequally in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. That said, courts so far have ruled that, because these
provisions expand but do not restrict the right to vote, they do not lead to unlawful vote dilution.
See supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text. R
265 See Briffault, supra note 10, at 341 (“Local governments are often thought of as little R
democracies, providing fora for participation, deliberation and collective action concerning a
wide range of policy matters.”).
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on that rule.266 But if judicial interpretation will support a construction
of the language as a grant, then the court should permit cities and
towns to define their own electorate as a mechanism of local democ-
racy.267 State courts already have upheld local election rules, even in
the face of state laws on the same topic, as being “part of the core of
local self-determination.”268 Other courts have ruled that state elec-
tion laws are “models,” and not mandates, that a local jurisdiction
may adopt or alter pursuant to local concerns.269 Courts should simi-
larly employ an interpretative canon that sustains a local voting rule
unless state law creates a direct and unavoidable conflict. Put differ-
ently, courts should adopt a “clear statement” rule that requires a spe-
cific legislative declaration that the state intends to preempt local
voting laws expanding the franchise.270 In the absence of this clear
statement, courts should uphold local expansions of the right to
vote.271
Courts should also adopt a clear statement standard for analyzing
home rule provisions. More specifically, courts should interpret home
rule statutes to allow localities to enact local laws that bring more vot-
ers into local democracy. Judges should reject a local rule that en-
hances voting rights only if the home rule provision explicitly
demands it. That is, courts should uphold local election rules unless
the state has directly exempted voting laws in its home rule
authorization.
Some state courts have adopted a useful four-part test to deter-
mine whether home rule permits a local ordinance, which courts also
can apply to local voting laws. Courts will ask:
First, does an actual conflict with state law exist? If there is
no conflict between the charter city enactment and a state
266 See supra Section III.C.1.
267 This analysis is similar to what Professor Robert Williams has termed “negative implica-
tion” within state constitutions. A general statement in a state constitution implicitly allows
more specific action on that subject. See ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE
CONSTITUTIONS 331 (2009).
268 See Briffault, Home Rule, supra note 174, at 24. R
269 See id. at 25 (noting that some state courts have found that state election laws are simply
“models unless the state expressly articulated an intent to preempt”).
270 See id. at 25–26 (citing cases from New York and Texas that adopted a clear statement
rule and upheld local election procedures).
271 Of course, requiring a “clear statement” might simply lead a state that wishes to pre-
empt local voting expansions to pass explicit laws banning the local rules. But that is how our
governmental structure is supposed to work. If proponents of local laws oppose these statewide
efforts, they will simply need to convince their fellow state citizens to vote for legislators who
will allow local voting rights.
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law, then there is no need for a court to determine whether
the issue is a municipal affair or a statewide concern. Second,
does the given activity “implicate” a municipal affair? Third,
does the conflicting state law address a matter of statewide
concern? Fourth, is the conflicting state law “reasonably re-
lated” and “narrowly tailored” to address the statewide
concern?272
Based on the policy rationales discussed above,273 courts analyzing a
local rule expanding the right to vote under this test should generally
not find a conflict under the first prong. No conflict exists between a
general state law on voter qualifications and a more specific local law
that applies only to local jurisdictions, unless the state explicitly has
preempted local voting rules under its substantive election laws or
home rule authorization. Moreover, under the second prong, a local
voting rule necessarily addresses a municipal affair—local democracy.
Statewide voting rules—when they do not prohibit local action explic-
itly—implicate statewide, not municipal, democracy. There is no state-
wide concern if a town expands the right to vote for its own elections
because that action has a predominantly local impact. Thus, unless a
state law specifically dictates voter qualifications or takes away home
rule authorization, courts using this test should find no conflict and
therefore should sanction robust local authority to dictate the electo-
rate for local elections.274
Deference for local action expanding the right to vote is war-
ranted to vindicate the federalism ideals in local democratic govern-
ance. Cities have their own governmental structures, as well as
ordinances, that bind local residents, so courts should allow these mu-
nicipalities and their constituents to adopt a more expansive theory of
democracy and representation. Cities might have particular local con-
cerns that a larger electorate should address, such as vacation towns in
which the entire community’s economy depends on catering to non-
resident property owners. Local voting rights and democratic repre-
sentation are matters of local, not statewide, concern because these
concepts go to the core of local governance.275 As one commenter ex-
272 Kini, supra note 121, at 288 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Johnson v. Bradley, 841 P.2d R
990, 996 (Cal. 1992) (en banc)); see also Yang, supra note 135, at 75–76 (arguing for home rule R
provisions to allow local jurisdictions to enact rules allowing noncitizens to vote).
273 See supra Section III.A.
274 See Briffault, Home Rule, supra note 174, at 19 (“In other words, if it is a question of R
local political structure and there are no external effects and no state harm from intrastate varia-
tions, local innovations can prevail notwithstanding the conflict with state law.”).
275 See May v. Town of Mountain Village, 969 P.2d 790, 794 (Colo. App. 1998) (upholding a
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plains, in justifying San Francisco’s consideration of expanding the
right to vote to noncitizens for school board elections:
San Francisco has a legitimate interest in fostering a more
representative, responsive local school board that will take
into account the needs of its large immigrant student popula-
tion when making important educational policy decisions af-
fecting San Francisco’s public schools. The home rule
doctrine provides a strong legal basis for upholding San
Francisco’s decision to enfranchise noncitizens in school
board elections, despite contradictory state laws regarding
voter qualifications.276
Stifling local experimentation and innovation is dangerous, espe-
cially when it comes to representative democracy. Some expansions of
the right to vote have occurred initially through local laws.277 Courts
should allow that expansion to continue. A groundswell of support
may then spread across the country, forcing state legislatures and
Congress to consider the issue.278 Courts should permit cities to act as
“test tubes of democracy” unless a state law explicitly requires a con-
trary result. Furthermore, courts have historically deferred to local
laws on the right to vote.279 Even more recently, state courts have up-
held local innovations on election laws “either by determining that the
local interest in local elections or the structure of local government
outweighs the state interest behind the conflicting state statute or by
concluding that the state did not mean to preclude local departures
from state-prescribed models.”280 This same rationale should apply to
all expansions of the right to vote.
If a local jurisdiction has decided that sixteen- and seventeen-
year-olds, noncitizens, or nonresident property owners have a suffi-
cient stake in local governance, then a court should not prevent that
Colorado town’s decision to enfranchise nonresident property owners and explaining that “the
qualification of voters in local and municipal elections is a matter of local, not statewide,
concern”).
276 Kini, supra note 121, at 292. In 2016, San Francisco voters adopted an ordinance to R
grant voting rights to noncitizens for school board elections. See Rong-Gong Lin II, San Fran-
cisco Measure to Allow Noncitizen Parents to Vote in School Board Elections Leading, L.A.
TIMES (Nov. 9, 2016, 4:02 AM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/trailguide/la-na-election-
aftermath-updates-trail-san-francisco-measure-to-allow-1478692962-htmlstory.html [http://
perma.cc/27C5-TF2B].
277 See supra Parts I, II.
278 See Diller, supra note 176, at 1129 (“Once a city or a number of cities have put an issue R
on the nation’s policy agenda, . . . Congress or state legislatures may feel more compelled to
address it.”).
279 See supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text. R
280 Briffault, Home Rule, supra note 174, at 3. R
\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\85-4\GWN401.txt unknown Seq: 57  1-SEP-17 14:10
2017] THE RIGHT TO VOTE UNDER LOCAL LAW 1095
expansion of the electorate. As Professor Diller explains, courts
should apply a presumption against preemption for good-faith local
policy experiments because “a good-faith policy experiment is a city’s
reasonable attempt to solve a social problem in a way that fairly inter-
nalizes the costs of the policy experiment, at least vis-a`-vis other cit-
ies.”281 Here, the social problem is the lack of citizen participation and
voter turnout in local elections; the good-faith policy experiment is
simply a municipality’s decision to include more people in the electo-
rate. In addition, allowing local jurisdictions to define the scope of
local democracy and local representation can provide valuable infor-
mation for future state or national debates about expanding the right
to vote.
While deference is appropriate for expansions of the franchise,
that same deference is inappropriate for laws that restrict voter ac-
cess.282 Both federal and state laws set a floor for voter qualifications,
such as the Twenty-Sixth Amendment’s stipulation that no jurisdiction
may deny the right to vote to anyone aged eighteen or older.283 A
local rule that raises the voting age is obviously unconstitutional and
no deference is warranted. Further, from a normative perspective, no
societal good comes from local rules that restrict who may vote. Only
entrenched majorities benefit from reduced voter rolls.284 Denying the
right to vote to someone who otherwise should participate harms the
ideal of democratic inclusion.285 Excluding these voters demeans their
place in our democratic society and calls into question the very effi-
cacy of that democracy. Restrictive rules also may impugn the demo-
cratic legitimacy of elected officials who might enjoy the support of
only a minority of the population because others were shut out of the
process. Moreover, incumbents might try to entrench themselves in
281 Diller, supra note 176, at 1170-71 (footnotes omitted). R
282 See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969) (invalidating
New York law that allowed only property owners and parents of school children to vote in
school board elections).
283 U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
284 For a stark discussion of local voter purges and other voter suppression tactics in south-
ern states, see Michael Wines, Critics See Efforts by Counties and Towns to Purge Minority Vot-
ers from Rolls, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/01/us/critics-see-
efforts-to-purge-minorities-from-voter-rolls-in-new-elections-rules.html. The article highlights
voter purges of African Americans in a small Georgia town, demonstrating poignantly why def-
erence is inappropriate for voter restrictions.
285 See Hamilton, supra note 100, at 1479 (advocating for a “democratic principle of pre- R
sumptive inclusion” by noting that “an individual’s status as a legal subject of the government,
and thus a member of the political community and one of ‘the people,’ presumptively entitles the
individual to participate in the governance of a democratic system”).
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power by restricting the voting rights of members of groups that op-
pose them, warranting skepticism toward franchise-reducing rules.286
Of course, the opposite could be true as well: politicians might
enfranchise new groups specifically because these new voters will
likely support them, making voter expansion a means of incumbent
protection. But politically motivated expansions of the franchise are
less concerning than voter restrictions based on a norm of representa-
tive democracy that favors inclusivity.287 As discussed above, if in-
creased participation is itself a desirable norm for a well-functioning
representative democracy, then it should not matter if the underlying
goal for the expansion was itself political. Thus, local voter expan-
sions, even if done for political reasons, warrant judicial deference (if
they are not discriminatory), while voter restrictions do not. Put dif-
ferently, the threat of incumbency protection is a price we might have
to pay for laws that expand voter access, but it is a price well worth it
given the long-term benefits of increased participation to our concept
of democracy. It is not necessarily entrenchment if new voters con-
tinue to support the politicians who helped give them the vote so long
as the elections remain structurally fair.
Deferring to voter expansions but not limitations does not mean
that a local jurisdiction could never pass a law that has the effect of
restricting voter access. Perhaps a town decides to lower the voting
age to sixteen, but then after a few elections realizes that the idea is
not working as anticipated, so it wants to go back to a minimum voter
age of eighteen. That jurisdiction could still change its voter qualifica-
tions and raise the voting age. To do so, however, the jurisdiction
would have to satisfy heightened scrutiny, without any deference. The
jurisdiction must have a strong enough reason to revert back to its
prior, more restrictive rule. This test is similar to a nonretrogression
principle that courts already use for Voting Rights Act claims.288 The
anchor for this analysis, as applied to local expansions of suffrage,
rests within the text of state constitutions in their explicit conferral of
the right to vote.289 In essence, judicial deference should serve as a
one-way ratchet: deference for local expansions; no deference, and
286 See Schleicher, supra note 172, at 248, 250 (advocating against judicial deference for R
local election laws).
287 See supra Section III.A.
288 See Michael J. Pitts, Rescuing Retrogression, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 741, 742, 751 n.51
(2016) (arguing that courts should apply the nonretrogression principle typically used for claims
under now-defunct section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to claims under section 2).
289 See generally Douglas, supra note 6. R
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heightened scrutiny, for local restrictions.290 Although a one-way
ratchet for voter expansions could, in theory, act as a deterrent to ex-
perimentation itself, once a few courageous localities demonstrate the
positive effect of broadening the right to vote for local democracy,
others will surely follow suit even if they know it will be harder to
repeal the law in the future. Moreover, this mode of judicial interpre-
tation best comports with the history of expanded voting rights, the
benefits of local experimentation, a theory of democracy that allows
the people of a governmental entity to decide for themselves who
should comprise the electorate, and a notion of inclusiveness as a
democratic ideal.
4. Practical Difficulties in Expanding Local Voter
Qualification Rules
The final potential hurdle for local expansions of the right to vote
is more practical: how do we implement a system in which more voters
can participate in local elections than in federal or statewide elec-
tions? For example, how can a jurisdiction easily and efficiently ad-
minister an election in which only those sixteen and older can vote for
certain races (local elections), while those eighteen and older can vote
for all offices (federal and state elections)?
Many cities and towns already hold their local elections on differ-
ent days than the national or state elections.291 For instance, Takoma
Park, Maryland, had its most recent city election in an off-year (2015),
so only city races—in which sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds could
vote—were on the ballot.292 Given that many places already hold sep-
arate local elections on different days, voter expansions for these elec-
tions present no significant administrative hurdles. However, having
local elections on different days or in odd-numbered years dampens
turnout.293 If the policy goal is to expand the electorate and encourage
greater participation, then using a system that might decrease turnout
is contrary to that ideal. Further, if a jurisdiction does not already hold
290 See supra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing Delaware’s use of a one-way R
ratchet for nonresident voting expansions).
291 See, e.g., SARAH F. ANZIA, TIMING AND TURNOUT: HOW OFF-CYCLE ELECTIONS
FAVOR ORGANIZED GROUPS 2 (2014).
292 See GENERATION CITIZEN, LOWERING THE VOTING AGE FOR LOCAL ELECTIONS IN
TAKOMA PARK AND HYATTSVILLE, MD 4 (2016), http://vote16usa.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/
10/Final-MD-Case-Study.pdf; Results of Past Elections, CITY OF TAKOMA PARK, https://takoma
parkmd.gov/results-of-past-elections/ [https://perma.cc/RK8T-9446] (last visited May 31, 2017).
293 See ANZIA, supra note 291, at 2–3; ZOLTAN L. HAJNAL, AMERICA’S UNEVEN DEMOC- R
RACY: RACE, TURNOUT, AND REPRESENTATION IN CITY POLITICS 159 (2010) (finding that “elec-
tion timing is the most important factor in explaining local voter turnout”).
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local elections on different days, then adding additional Election Days
is cost prohibitive.
The better approach, then, is to use election technology to facili-
tate this change. The technology already exists and is in use to make it
easy to implement a system that provides individuals with the option
to vote for only certain offices depending on their residence or party
affiliation. For example, on primary day, local precincts will give a
voter only the ballot for the party in which he or she is registered (in
states that limit primary voters to party members or independents).294
Similarly, many jurisdictions provide for early voting at a central
county clerk’s office, with the electronic voting machine showing only
the races for the voter’s particular precinct.295 Thus, electronic ma-
chines exist that will allow voters to cast ballots for only the offices for
which state law deems them eligible. This same technology could dif-
ferentiate between voters using other voter qualifications, such as age
or citizenship, and then display only local offices to voters eligible to
vote solely in local races.
Moving away from precinct-based voting on Election Day also
would solve this problem. Some jurisdictions use a system in which
individuals need not vote in person at their home precincts. Regard-
less of where they vote, the electronic voting machines show only the
races for their home residence.296 In Don˜a Ana County, New Mexico,
election officials successfully implemented a system of non-precinct-
based voting; instead of having to go to their home precinct, voters
may use any of the thirty-nine Voting Convenience Centers in the
county.297 They can vote at the voting center closest to their work, for
example, and the voting machine will display only those elections in
which they are eligible to vote based on their home address. The same
system can work for local expansions of the right to vote. For instance,
in a jurisdiction that has lowered the voting age, the voter’s registra-
294 See, e.g., Primaries, FAIRVOTE, http://www.fairvote.org/primaries#open_and_closed_pri
maries (last visited May 31, 2017).
295 See, e.g., Office of the Tex. Sec’y of State, How to Vote, VOTETEXAS.GOV, http://
www.votetexas.gov/voting/how.html [https://perma.cc/WZ3A-Z5H8] (last visited May 31, 2017)
(discussing use of electronic voting machines); Office of the Tex. Sec’y of State, Where to Vote,
VOTETEXAS.GOV, http://www.votetexas.gov/voting/where.html [https://perma.cc/968X-NS47]
(last visited May 31, 2017) (“Registered and eligible voters may vote at ANY early voting loca-
tion located in the county of residence. Whether you are at home, work or out running errands,
you will be able to find a polling place near you.”).
296 See Brian Heaton, Tech Helps End Precinct Voting in New Mexico County, GOV’T
TECH. (June 27, 2012), http://www.govtech.com/e-government/Tech-Helps-End-Precinct-Voting-
in-New-Mexico-County.html.
297 Id.
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tion file will include both the address and age of the voter, thereby
dictating which races the ballot will display. A voter who is sixteen
would see only the ballot for the local races; a voter who is eighteen
would see all offices.
Jurisdictions with mail-in voting, such as Colorado, Oregon, and
Washington,298 similarly use technology to differentiate between vot-
ers. These states mail to voters a ballot that lists only the races specific
to each voter, so counties in these states could incorporate other eligi-
bility criteria if the jurisdiction expands the right to vote for local of-
fices. Alternatively, poll workers at precincts could simply have a
separate ballot available for the local offices. For instance, a sixteen-
year-old who shows up to vote will receive only that ballot; all voters
eighteen years and older will receive that ballot along with the ballot
containing the other offices for which they may vote.
If a city within a particular county has expanded the right to vote
only for city elections, and yet the larger county runs the election it-
self, then there are additional issues of election administration to con-
sider. Yet voting technology can still fix this problem, producing a
different ballot for eligible voters in the city. To be sure, the county
election officials would have to fine-tune the election apparatus, but
that is relatively simple through voting technology, and is feasible
even in counties using traditional paper ballots.
In sum, practical challenges exist, but they simply require thought
and experimentation to create a system that allows jurisdictions to
broaden the electorate for local elections. Technology already facili-
tates differentiation among voters based on their eligibility to vote for
certain offices, so increased use of that technology can mitigate any
implementation concerns when a locality expands the right to vote.
CONCLUSION
Strong policy arguments support an expansion of the right to vote
for local offices. History shows that some individuals initially gained
the right to vote through municipal ordinances. Enhanced local voting
rights will produce a more representative local government, create a
habit of voting for various groups such as younger voters that will
ameliorate low turnout, and strengthen local democracy.
In some states, supporters of local voting rules must pass a state
constitutional amendment or legislative fix. These states should
298 See Absentee and Early Voting, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Mar. 20, 2017) http://
www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/absentee-and-early-voting.aspx.
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change their laws to give municipalities a say in who can vote for local
offices. In states where municipalities already have more control over
their elections, any new voting rules may result in legal challenges.
Courts should defer to local laws that expand the franchise, while
training a more skeptical eye on voter restrictions. This deference best
comports with a notion of democracy that favors inclusivity and per-
mits local jurisdictions to experiment with different forms of represen-
tation. Technology can solve any issues of implementation.
The time is ripe, then, for every jurisdiction in the United States
to expand the local electorate—for sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds,
noncitizens (who are lawful permanent residents), nonresident prop-
erty owners, felons, or anyone else that the local population believes
has a sufficient tie to the community, stake in local governance, and
cognitive ability. Local expansions of the right to vote will help to im-
prove our democracy by including more people in the democratic
process.
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APPENDIX: POSSIBILITY OF LOCAL LAWS EXPANDING THE RIGHT
TO VOTE IN THE FIFTY STATES (AND D.C.)299
A * signifies that the rule is particularly open to legal interpreta-





State Const. State Legislative State Const. State Legislative Enfranchise
Impediment— Impediment— Impediment— Impediment— Nonresidents in
Voter Voter Qualifica- Lack of Home Lack of Home Certain No Clear
State Qualifications tions301 Rule302 Rule303 Elections Impediments
Alabama X 304 X305
Alaska X306 X307
Arizona X308 X309
299 Thanks to my research assistant Grant Sharp for compiling the initial version of this
Appendix and to the organization Generation Citizen for its helpful research.
300 Editors’ note: Sources below are cited with both the preferred official reporter and a
parallel citation to the statutory text on each state’s website. The editors substantiated the
sources using the online materials.
301 This column focuses on state statutes that dictate substantive voter qualifications. The
state also may have procedural rules on voter registration that may be relevant.
302 This chart does not differentiate between “imperio” and “legislative” forms of home
rule given that most state courts have not drawn this distinction in election law cases. See supra
notes 228–31 and accompanying text. R
303 Any attempt to categorize states based on their home rule doctrines is bound to involve
some discretion because the varying rules that come from state constitutions and state statutes
involve differing local governmental structures. There may also be variation between cities and
counties. See Diller, supra note 232, at 1130. This chart presents the data based on the language R
from state constitutions and state statutes. Judicial decisions in these states may shed additional
light.
304 Alabama’s constitution and code phrase the right to vote as a grant. See ALA. CONST.
art. VIII, §§ 177–178; ALA. CODE § 17-3-30 (2017), http://alisondb.legislature.state.al.us/alison/
codeofalabama/1975/17-3-30.htm. But the Alabama Constitution limits home rule. See ALA.
CONST. art. IV, § 105.
305 Alabama election law provides that the state’s election code governs municipal
elections. ALA. CODE § 17-1-1 (2017), http://alisondb.legislature.state.al.us/alison/codeofalaba
ma/1975/17-1-1.htm.
306 Alaska’s constitution phrases the right to vote as a grant. See ALASKA CONST. art. V,
§ 1. Yet ALASKA STAT. § 29.26.050 (2017), http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/statutes.asp#29.26
.050, grants citizens the right to vote “only if” they meet the requirements of ALASKA STAT.
§ 15.05.010 (2017), http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/statutes.asp#15.05.010, phrasing the right to
vote as a restriction.
307 Alaska’s home rule law prohibits municipalities from altering voter qualifications.
ALASKA STAT. § 29.10.200(25) (2017), http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/statutes.asp#29.10.200.
308 Arizona’s constitution phrases the right to vote as a restriction. See ARIZ. CONST. art.
VII, § 2 (“No person shall be entitled to vote . . . unless” they meet certain qualification
standards). The state’s election code, however, phrases the right to vote as a grant. See ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-101 (2017), http://www.azleg.gov/viewdocument/?docName=http://www
.azleg.gov/ars/16/00101.htm.
309 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-404 (2017), http://www.azleg.gov/viewdocument/?doc
Name=http://www.azleg.gov/ars/48/00404.htm.
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310 ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-123-302 (2017) (Arkansas’s online code is maintained by Lexis
and does not allow for direct links to individual provisions, but the full code is available at http://
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/arcode/Default.asp).
311 Arkansas’s constitution and code phrase the right to vote as a grant. See ARK. CONST.
art. III, § 1; ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-1-101(33) (2017). Arkansas also provides municipalities with
broad home rule powers. See ARK. CONST. amend. LV, § 1; ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-42-307 (2017).
312 CAL. ELEC. CODE § 12286 (West 2017), http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_dis
playSection.xhtml?sectionNum=12286&lawCode=ELEC.
313 California’s constitution and code phrase the right to vote as a grant. See CAL. CONST.
art. II, § 2; CAL. ELEC. CODE § 2000 (West 2017), http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/
codes_displaySection.xhtml?sectionNum=2000&lawCode=ELEC. The state constitution confers
upon municipalities broad home rule power to govern “municipal affairs.” CAL. CONST. art. XI,
§ 5(a). Caselaw supports the proposition that elections are municipal affairs, thus granting
municipalities the power to expand voter qualifications. See Socialist Party v. Uhl, 103 P. 181,
186 (Cal. 1909). The state’s election code includes some requirements regarding the date of
holding local elections but does not speak to voter qualifications in local elections. CAL. ELEC.
CODE §§ 1300–1304 (West 2017), http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.
xhtml?sectionNum=1300&lawCode=ELEC. The combination of these laws gives California
municipalities the authority to expand voter qualifications.
314 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-26-103, 37-41-104(2), 37-42-106(2) (2017) (Colorado’s online
code is maintained by Lexis and does not allow for direct links to individual provisions, but the
full code is available at http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/colorado/).
315 Colorado’s constitution and laws phrase the right to vote as a grant. COLO. CONST. art.
VII, § 1; COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-2-101 (2017). But Colorado’s election code includes a specific
provision on voter qualifications for municipal elections, suggesting that cities and towns cannot
expand beyond the qualifications listed in this statute. COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-10-201 (2017). Yet
the Colorado Constitution gives charter cities broad power to shape their own election
procedures. See COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6. Moreover, state law says that the municipal election
code does not apply to cities and towns that have home rule. COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-10-1539
(2017). Thus, the state law dictating voter qualifications for municipal elections likely does not
apply if a city has home rule authority. See May v. Town of Mountain Village, 969 P.2d 790, 794
(Colo. App. 1998) (ruling that a town could allow nonresident property owners to vote in local
elections under the state’s home rule authorization).
316 Although Connecticut’s constitution and code phrase the right to vote as a grant, state
legislation forbids municipalities from altering the qualifications of voters. See CONN. CONST. art.
VI, § 1; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-6 (2017), https://www.cga.ct.gov/current/pub/chap_090.htm#sec_7-
6; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-192a (2017), https://www.cga.ct.gov/current/pub/chap_099.htm#sec_7-
192a.
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317 Delaware’s constitution and code phrase the right to vote as a grant. See DEL. CONST.
art. V, § 2; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 7543 (2017), http://delcode.delaware.gov/title15/c075/sc03/
index.shtml. However, Delaware’s code forbids municipalities from changing voter
qualifications. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 835(a)(3) (2017), http://delcode.delaware.gov/title22/
c008/sc06/index.shtml.
318 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1402(a)(3) (2017), http://delcode.delaware.gov/title16/c014/
index.shtml.
319 Florida’s constitution phrases the right to vote as a grant. See FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
However, Florida’s code phrases the right to vote as a restriction. See FLA. STAT. § 97.041
(2017), http://www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=display_Statute&Search_String
=&URL=0000-0099/0097/Sections/0097.041.html. Florida municipalities generally have home
rule authority “except as otherwise provided by law,” meaning that there would be no home rule
impediment if the state amended its substantive voter qualification provision. See FLA. CONST.
art. VIII, § 2(b); FLA. STAT. § 166.021(1) (2017), http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?
App_mode=display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0100-0199/0166/Sections/0166.021.html.
320 Georgia’s constitution phrases the right to vote as a grant. See GA. CONST. art. II, § 1,
para. 2. However, Georgia’s code phrases the right to vote as a restriction. See GA. CODE ANN.
§ 21-2-216 (2017) (Georgia’s online code is maintained by Lexis and does not allow for direct
links to individual provisions, but the full code is available at http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics
/gacode/Default.asp).
321 Georgia’s home rule statute forbids municipalities from changing voting procedures,
which presumably would include voter qualifications. GA. CODE ANN. § 36-35-6(a)(1) (2017).
322 Hawaii’s constitution phrases the right to vote as a grant. See HAW. CONST. art. II, § 1.
However, Hawaii’s code phrases the right to vote as a restriction. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-11
(2017), http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/hrscurrent/Vol01_Ch0001-0042F/HRS0011/HRS_0011-
0011.htm.
323 Hawaii’s code states that municipalities cannot alter election procedures for any
election held in the state, which likely includes voter qualifications. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-3
(2017), http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/hrscurrent/Vol01_Ch0001-0042F/HRS0011/HRS_0011-00
03.htm.
324 Idaho’s constitution phrases the right to vote as a grant. IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 2.
However, Idaho’s code states that “[n]o elector shall be permitted to vote if . . . disqualified” by
the voting requirements in the state’s constitution. IDAHO CODE § 34-403 (2017), https://legisla
ture.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/Title34/T34CH4/SECT34-403/. Yet the Idaho Constitution
only “disqualifies” felons, see IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3, meaning that judicial interpretation of
the statute might allow municipalities to extend voting rights to other groups. Moreover, Idaho’s
constitution grants municipalities the power to enact regulations that are not in conflict with the
general laws of Idaho. IDAHO CONST. art. XII, § 2. This suggests that, so long as the
“disqualified” provision applies only to felons, Idaho municipalities enjoy home rule power to
expand voter access to other constituencies besides felons.
325 Illinois’s constitution and code phrase the right to vote as a grant. See ILL. CONST. art.
III, § 1; 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-1 (2017), http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/fulltext.asp?Doc
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Name=001000050K3-1. In regard to home rule, Illinois’s constitution grants municipalities broad
authority. See ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6.
326 The Indiana Constitution and Code both phrase the right to vote as a grant. See IND.
CONST. art. II, § 2; IND. CODE § 3-7-13-1 (2017), http://iga.in.gov/static-documents/6/9/d/6/
69d60e63/TITLE3_AR7_ch13.pdf. But Indiana’s code prohibits municipalities from legislating
on conduct that a state agency already regulates. IND. CODE § 36-1-3-8(a)(7) (2017), http://
iga.in.gov/static-documents/c/5/d/3/c5d3a46f/TITLE36_AR1_ch3.pdf. Considering that the
Indiana Secretary of State regulates elections, municipalities would likely be unable to expand
voter qualifications. About the Office, IN.GOV: SECRETARY ST., http://www.in.gov/sos/2362.htm
(last visited June 3, 2017). That said, a court could find that the state agency does not necessarily
regulate voter qualifications for local elections, opening the door to local laws on this issue.
327 Although Iowa’s constitution phrases the right to vote as a grant, the election code
phrases it as a restriction. See IOWA CONST. art. II, § 1; IOWA CODE § 48A.5 (2017), https://
www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/2016/48A.pdf. Iowa’s constitution grants municipalities “home
rule power and authority, not inconsistent with the laws of the general assembly, to determine
their local affairs and government,” meaning that there would be no home rule impediment if
Iowa changed its substantive election law. IOWA CONST. art. III, § 38A.
328 Although Kansas’s constitution phrases the right to vote as a grant, the election code
phrases it as a restriction. See KAN. CONST. art. V, § 1; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-2306 (2017), http://
kslegislature.org/li/m/statute/025_000_0000_chapter/025_023_0000_article/025_023_0006_section/
025_023_0006_k.pdf. Kansas’s municipalities have broad home rule authority. See KAN. CONST.
art. XII, § 5.
329 The Kentucky Constitution phrases the right to vote as a grant, although it denies voting
rights to felons. See KY. CONST. § 145. The state election code does not mention voter
qualifications. Regarding home rule, Kentucky allows municipalities to take action that is in
furtherance of a public purpose. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 82.082 (West 2017), http://
www.lrc.ky.gov/statutes/statute.aspx?id=25036. However, Kentucky does not confer home rule
authority where “there is a comprehensive scheme of legislation on the same general subject.”
Id. The state has an election code, but state law does not include restrictions on voter
qualifications. The question remains, then, whether the election code itself is a “comprehensive
scheme” on this issue given that it says nothing about voter qualifications. Although technically
an open question, the reasoning of a recent Kentucky Supreme Court decision, which
invalidated a Louisville minimum wage ordinance that went beyond the state’s minimum wage
law, casts doubt on the ability of Kentucky municipalities to enact their own election rules given
that the state has a detailed election code. See Ky. Rest. Ass’n v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro
Gov’t, 501 S.W.3d 425, 430 (Ky. 2016) (explaining that “express preemption is not required when
the General Assembly has enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme” on a topic).
330 Louisiana’s constitution phrases the right to vote as a grant, but the election code
phrases it as a restriction, most explicitly with respect to age. See LA. CONST. art. I, § 10; LA.
STAT. ANN. § 18:101 (2017), https://legis.la.gov/Legis/Law.aspx?d=81242. Louisiana’s constitu-
tion allows localities to adopt home rule charters. See LA. CONST. art. VI, § 5.
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Minnesota X336 X337 X338*
Mississippi X339
331 Maine’s constitution phrases the right to vote as a grant. See ME. CONST. art. II, § 1.
However, the state’s election code phrases the right to vote as a restriction. See ME. STAT. tit. 21-
A, § 111 (2017), http://legislature.maine.gov/statutes/21-A/title21-Asec111.html.
332 Although Maine’s constitution grants broad home rule powers, its election code
expressly preempts municipalities from changing voter qualifications from those the state has
set. See ME. CONST. art. VIII, pt. II, § 1; ME. STAT. tit. 30-A, § 2501 (2017), http://legislature.
maine.gov/statutes/30-A/title30-Asec2501.html.
333 Maryland’s constitution and code phrase the right to vote as a grant. See MD. CONST.
art. I, § 1; MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 3-102 (LexisNexis 2017), http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/
2017RS/Statute_Web/gel/3-102.pdf. Maryland’s election code expressly states that municipalities,
except for Baltimore, may govern their own elections. ELEC. § 2-202, http://mgaleg.maryland.
gov/2017RS/Statute_Web/gel/2-202.pdf.
334 The Massachusetts Constitution does not explicitly mention voter qualifications,
although it says that the Commonwealth’s “inhabitants” shall “have an equal right to elect
officers.” MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. IX. Massachusetts law phrases the right to vote as a grant, with
an exception for felons. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 51, § 1 (2017), https://malegislature.gov/Laws/
GeneralLaws/PartI/TitleVIII/Chapter51/Section1. Municipalities theoretically have home rule
authority under state law to regulate their own elections, but they must go through an extensive
process to amend their charter, which includes gaining legislative approval. See MASS. CONST.
amend. art. LXXXIX, § 8; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43B (2017), https://malegislature.gov/Laws/
GeneralLaws/PartI/TitleVII/Chapter43B.
335 Michigan’s constitution phrases the right to vote as a grant, but Michigan’s election code
phrases the right to vote as a restriction. See MICH. CONST. art. II, § 1; MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 168.492 (2017), http://www.legislature.mi.gov/(S(ecw2v0jr15hffhsrdiljmqoh))/mileg.aspx?
page=getobject&objectname=mcl-168-492. Michigan’s home rule statute provides, “No
provision of any city charter shall conflict with or contravene the provisions of any general law of
the state.” MICH. COMP. LAWS § 117.36 (2017), http://www.legislature.mi.gov/(S(sb1i1553z
2n0w0e1wlvomqmh))/mileg.aspx?page=getObject&objectName=MCl-117-36.
336 Although Minnesota’s constitution initially phrases the right to vote as a grant, it
subsequently states that if a person does not meet the “above requirements,” that person “shall
not be entitled or permitted to vote at any election in this state.” MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
337 Minnesota’s law lists several requirements for voters, including: aged eighteen or older,
citizen of the United States, and resident of the state for at least twenty days before the election.
MINN. STAT. § 201.014 (2017), https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/?id=201.014.
338 Minnesota’s election code applies to municipal elections, except where a “statutory and
home rule charter” city regulates the conduct of local elections in its charter. MINN. STAT.
§ 205.02 (2017), https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/?id=205.02. Thus, it appears that if a locality
provides, in its charter, the manner of holding local elections, then the state statute saying that
state law regulates municipal elections does not apply. Judicial interpretation of this provision
may be helpful.
339 Mississippi’s constitution and law phrase the right to vote as a grant (except for felons
and those adjudicated mentally incompetent). See MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241; MISS. CODE
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ANN. § 23-15-11 (2017) (Mississippi’s online code is maintained by Lexis and does not allow for
direct links to individual provisions, but the full code is available at http://www.lexisnexis.com/
hottopics/mscode/). Yet Mississippi’s code prohibits municipalities from altering the
“requirements, practices, or procedures for municipal elections.” MISS. CODE. ANN. § 21-17-5(2)
(2017).
340 Missouri’s constitution and laws phrase the right to vote as a grant (except for felons
and those adjudicated mentally incompetent). See MO. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; MO. REV. STAT.
§ 115.133 (2017), http://www.moga.mo.gov/mostatutes/stathtml/11500001331.html. Missouri’s
constitution provides cities “all powers which the general assembly of the state of Missouri has
authority to confer upon any city.” MO. CONST. art. VI, § 19(a). Missouri’s election code
explicitly grants any city with a population over 400,000 the power to regulate its own elections.
MO. REV. STAT. § 122.650 (2017), http://www.moga.mo.gov/mostatutes/stathtml/12200006501.ht
ml?&me=122.650. Reading the two statutes together suggests that cities with a population below
400,000 do not have the authority to expand voter qualifications. Only Kansas City has a
population over 400,000. See QuickFacts: Kansas City city, Missouri, supra note 240. Thus, R
Kansas City, but not any other Missouri municipality, may enact local voter qualification rules
for city elections.
341 Montana’s constitution phrases the right to vote as a grant, except for felons. See MONT.
CONST. art. IV, § 2. However, Montana’s election code phrases the right to vote as a restriction.
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-1-111 (2017), http://leg.mt.gov/bills/mca/title_0130/chapter_0010/
part_0010/section_0110/0130-0010-0010-0110.html.
342 Montana’s home rule statute states that municipalities are subject to Montana’s election
code. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-3-708 (2017), http://leg.mt.gov/bills/mca/title_0070/chapter_0030/
part_0070/section_0080/0070-0030-0070-0080.html.
343 Nebraska’s constitution phrases the right to vote as a grant, but its election code phrases
the right to vote as a restriction. See NEB. CONST. art. VI, § 1; NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-110 (2017),
http://nebraskalegislature.gov/laws/statutes.php?statute=32-110. Nebraska law allows a city with
a population greater than 5,000 to adopt a home rule charter so long as it is “consistent with and
subject to the constitution and laws of this state.” NEB. CONST. art. XI, § 2.
344 NEB. REV. STAT. § 31-407 (2017), http://nebraskalegislature.gov/laws/statutes.php?stat
ute=31-407.
345 Nevada’s constitution and election code phrase the right to vote as a grant. See NEV.
CONST. art. II, § 1; NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.485 (2017), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/nrs/NRS-293.ht
ml#NRS293Sec485. Nevada’s home rule statute gives cities certain enumerated powers, but does
not list authority over local elections as one such power. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 268.008 (2017),
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/nrs/NRS-268.html#NRS268Sec008. However, Nevada’s election code
does give cities the power to “do all other things required to carry the election into effect,”
which strongly suggests they may have the authority to enact voter qualifications for local
elections. NEV. REV. STAT. § 293C.110 (2017), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/nrs/NRS-293C.html
#NRS293CSec110. Judicial interpretation may be helpful.
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New Mexico X349 X350
New York X351 X352
North
Carolina X353 X354
346 New Hampshire’s constitution and law phrase the right to vote as a grant. See N.H.
CONST., Bill of Rights, art. 11; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 654:1 (2017), http://www.gencourt.state.
nh.us/rsa/html/LXIII/654/654-1.htm. New Hampshire’s code provides that those who are
qualified to vote under New Hampshire’s election law are also qualified to vote in city elections.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49-C:5 (2017), http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/rsa/html/III/49-C/49-C-
5.htm. Thus, voter qualifications in local elections are tied directly to state voter qualification
rules. Accordingly, even though the constitution and statutes phrase the right to vote as a grant,
they still delineate specific voter qualifications that apply to local elections as well.
347 Although New Hampshire’s home rule statute grants cities certain powers, it does not
grant the power to change voter qualifications. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49-C:15 (2017),
http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/rsa/html/III/49-C/49-C-15.htm. It is not clear if this omission
means that there is no authority for local governments to enact local voter qualification rules.
348 New Jersey’s constitution and code phrase the right to vote as a grant. See N.J. CONST.
art. II, § 1, para. 3; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:4-1 (West 2017), http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/cgi-bin/njstats/
showsect.cgi?section=19%3A4-1&actn=getsect. The Rutgers source is listed by the New Jersey
Attorney General’s website as a source of the State’s statutes. Statutes, Regulations & Rules, N.J.
OFF. ATT’Y GEN., http://www.nj.gov/oag/statutes-regulations-rules.html [https://perma.cc/7TEN-
2WCX]. Furthermore, New Jersey’s home rule statute confers broad powers to local
governments. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:69A-30 (West 2017), http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/cgi-bin/
njstats/showsect.cgi?section=40%3A69A-30&actn=getsect.
349 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 73-18-30 (2017) (New Mexico’s online code is maintained by
Conway Greene and does not allow for direct links to individual provisions, but the full code is
available at http://public.nmcompcomm.us/nmpublic/gateway.dll/?f=templates&fn=default.htm).
350 New Mexico’s constitution and code phrase the right to vote as a grant. See N.M.
CONST. art. VII, § 1; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 49-3-5 (2017). Further, New Mexico’s constitution and
election code give municipalities the authority to regulate their own elections. See N.M. CONST.
art. X, § 6; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-8-1 (2017).
351 Although New York’s constitution phrases the right to vote as a grant, the election code
phrases it as a restriction. See N.Y. CONST. art. II, § 1; N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 5-102 (McKinney 2017)
(New York’s online code does not allow for direct links to individual provisions, but the full code
is available at http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us/lawssrch.cgi?NVLWO:).
352 New York’s election code provides that it is the sole source of law in regulating all New
York elections, including local elections. ELEC. § 1-102.
353 Although North Carolina’s constitution phrases the right to vote as a grant (except for
felons), North Carolina’s code phrases the right to vote as a restriction, at least for age and felon
status. See N.C. CONST. art. VI, §§ 1–3; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-55 (2017), http://www.ncleg.net/
EnactedLegislation/Statutes/PDF/BySection/Chapter_163/GS_163-55.pdf.
354 North Carolina does not explicitly provide home rule authority for elections.
Furthermore, North Carolina’s code has a section devoted solely to the regulation of municipal
elections. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-291–163-306 (2017), http://www.ncleg.net/gascripts/Statutes/
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StatutesTOC.pl?Chapter=0163. Accordingly, municipalities likely lack home rule power to
expand voter qualifications.
355 North Dakota’s constitution and statutes phrase the right to vote as a grant. See N.D.
CONST. art. II, § 1; N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-01-04 (2017), http://www.legis.nd.gov/cencode/t16-
1c01.pdf. Although North Dakota’s home rule statute provides broad powers to municipalities,
including giving them the authority to regulate local elections, it specifically exempts rules on
voter qualifications′zN.D. CENT. CODE §§ 40-05.1-06, 11-09.1-05 (2017), http://www.legis.nd.gov/
cencode/t40c05-1.pdf, http://www.legis.nd.gov/cencode/t11c09-1.pdf.
356 Ohio’s constitution and code phrase the right to vote as a grant. See OHIO CONST. art.
V, § 1; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3503.07 (LexisNexis 2017), http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/3503.07v1.
In regard to home rule, Ohio municipalities have the “authority to exercise all powers of local
self-government,” which presumably includes voter qualification rules for local elections. OHIO
CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
357 Both Oklahoma’s constitution and code phrase the right to vote as a grant. See OKLA.
CONST. art. III, § 1; OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 4-101 (2017) (Oklahoma’s online code does not allow
for direct links to individual provisions, but the full code is available at http://
www.oklegislature.gov/osstatuestitle.html). Oklahoma’s constitution provides broad home rule
powers to municipalities with a population over 2,000. See OKLA. CONST. art. XVIII, § 3(a).
358 Both Oregon’s constitution and code phrase the right to vote as a grant. See OR. CONST.
art. II, § 2; OR. REV. STAT. § 247.002(2) (2017), https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors/
ors247.html. But Oregon’s election code requires municipalities to conduct their elections
pursuant to the state election code, which likely prevents municipalities from expanding the
voter rolls. OR. REV. STAT. § 254.016 (2017), https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors/
ors254.html.
359 OR. REV. STAT. § 545.207 (2017), https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors/ors5
45.html.
360 Pennsylvania’s constitution and election code both phrase the right to vote as a grant,
but they require voters to be U.S. citizens as well as residents of the state. See PA. CONST. art.
VII, § 1; 25 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1301 (2017), http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/LI/cons
Check.cfm?txtType=HTM&ttl=25&div=0&chpt=13&sctn=1&subsctn=0. Thus, the constitution
and statutes would allow a Pennsylvania city to lower the voting age, but not to expand voting to
noncitizens or nonresidents.
361 Pennsylvania’s home rule statute explicitly denies municipalities power over the
registration of electors or the conduct of elections. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2962(a)(5) (2017), http:/
/www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/LI/consCheck.cfm?txtType=HTM&ttl=53&div=0&chpt=29&
sctn=62&subsctn=0.
362 Both Rhode Island’s constitution and code phrase the right to vote as a grant. See R.I.
CONST. art. II, § 1; 17 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-1-3 (2017), http://webserver.rilin.state.ri.us/Statutes/
TITLE17/17-1/17-1-3.htm. Rhode Island’s constitution also grants municipalities broad home
rule powers. See R.I. CONST. art. XIII, § 2.
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363 Although South Carolina’s constitution and code phrase the right to vote as a grant,
South Carolina’s constitution expressly prohibits municipalities from altering “election and
suffrage qualifications.” See S.C. CONST. art. II, § 4; id. art. VIII, § 14; S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-5-610
(2017), http://www.scstatehouse.gov/code/t07c005.php.
364 South Dakota’s constitution and code phrase the right to vote as a grant. See S.D.
CONST. art. VII, § 2; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-3-1 (2017), http://sdlegislature.gov/Statutes/
Codified_Laws/DisplayStatute.aspx?Type=statute&Statute=12-3-1. South Dakota’s constitution
also gives municipalities broad home rule authority. See S.D. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
365 Tennessee’s constitution and code phrase the right to vote as a grant. See TENN. CONST.
art. IV, § 1; TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-2-102 (2017) (Tennessee’s online code does not allow for
direct links to individual provisions, but the full code is available at http://www.lexisnexis.com/
hottopics/tncode/). Tennessee’s constitution also authorizes home rule. TENN. CONST. art. XI,
§ 9. However, Tennessee’s home rule statute specifically lists municipalities’ home rule powers
and does not include the expansion of voter qualifications. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-54 (2017).
Considering that there is a specific list of home rule powers and a lack of an express grant of
authority with regard to voter qualifications, it is unclear whether a Tennessee municipality may
expand the voter rolls for local elections. Judicial interpretation would be helpful.
366 TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-6-205 (2017).
367 The Texas Constitution explicitly prohibits certain people from voting, such as those
under eighteen years old, those deemed mentally incompetent, and felons. TEX. CONST. art. VI,
§§ 1, 2. The constitution also provides that anyone “who is a citizen of the United States and who
is a resident of this State shall be deemed a qualified voter,” which might be considered a grant
for these categories. Id. As to home rule, the Texas Constitution allows cities with a population
of more than 5,000 to adopt home rule charters, but “no charter or any ordinance passed under
said charter shall contain any provision inconsistent with the Constitution of the State, or of the
general laws enacted by the Legislature of this State.” Id. art. XI, § 5.
368 Texas law defines a “qualified voter” using specific criteria such as age, citizenship, and
residence. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 11.002 (West 2017), http://www.statutes.legis.state.tx.us/
Docs/EL/htm/EL.11.htm#11.002.
369 Utah’s constitution and code phrase the right to vote as a grant, but state law requires
any person voting in a municipal election to have been duly registered based on the state’s voter
qualification rules. See UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 2; UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-2-101 to 102
(LexisNexis 2017), https://le.utah.gov/xcode/Title20A/Chapter2/20A-2-S101.html?v=C20A-2-
S101_1800010118000101, https://le.utah.gov/xcode/Title20A/Chapter2/20A-2-S102.html?v=C20A
-2-S102_2014040320140513. Utah’s constitution grants municipalities broad home rule powers.
See UTAH CONST. art. XI, § 5.
370 Vermont’s constitution and statutes phrase the right to vote as a grant. See VT. CONST.
ch. 2, § 42; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2121 (2017), http://legislature.vermont.gov/statutes/section/
17/043/02121. Vermont’s home rule statute provides for municipalities to amend their charters,
but requires the city’s voters and the state’s General Assembly to approve any amendments. VT.
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STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2645 (2017), http://legislature.vermont.gov/statutes/section/17/055/02645.
Accordingly, a municipality could expand voter qualifications, but it would have to secure state
legislative approval.
371 Virginia’s constitution phrases voter qualifications as a restriction. See VA. CONST. art.
II, § 1.
372 Virginia law mimics the state constitution in listing voter qualifications as a restriction
and adds the limitations that voters must be at least eighteen years old, not convicted of felonies,
and not adjudicated as “incapacitated.” VA. CODE. ANN. § 24.2-101 (2017), http://
law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title24.2/chapter1/section24.2-101/. Regarding home rule, Virginia’s
law appears to grant localities home rule authority for “powers pertinent to the conduct of the
affairs and functions of the municipal government.” VA. CODE. ANN. § 15.2-1102 (2017), http://
law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title15.2/chapter11/section15.2-1102/.
373 Washington’s constitution phrases the right to vote as a grant, while its election code
simply refers to the state constitution for voter qualifications. See WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 1;
WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.04.061 (2017), https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=29A.04
.061. Furthermore, Washington’s election code grants broad home rule powers to “first class”
cities as it relates to elections. See WASH. REV. CODE § 35.22.280 (2017), http://app.leg.wa.gov/
rcw/default.aspx?cite=35.22.280.
374 Congress has granted Washington, D.C., the power to legislate on “all rightful subjects
of legislation,” which likely includes the right to expand voter qualifications. D.C. CODE § 1-
203.02 (2017), https://beta.code.dccouncil.us/dc/council/code/sections/1-203.02.html. However,
Congress has the power to repeal such action. Id. § 1-206.01 (2017), https://beta.code.dccouncil
.us/dc/council/code/sections/1-206.01.html.
375 The West Virginia Constitution discusses voter qualifications as restrictions and lists
several groups who may not vote, including “minors,” those judged mentally incompetent,
nonresidents, and felons. W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1. It does not say anything, however, about
U.S. citizenship.
376 The West Virginia Code mimics the state constitution in listing voter qualifications as
restrictions but also more specifically says that those under eighteen years old may not vote
except in a primary election if the voter will be eighteen by the general election. W. VA. CODE
§ 3-1-3 (2017), http://www.legis.state.wv.us/wvcode/Code.cfm?chap=03&art=1. As to home rule,
West Virginia provides broad home rule authority so long as local law is not inconsistent with the
state constitution or state laws. See W. VA. CODE § 8-12-2 (2017), http://www.legis.state.wv.us/
wvcode/Code.cfm?chap=08&art=12. There would be no home rule impediment if West Virginia
amended its constitution and state law on voter qualifications.
377 Wisconsin’s constitution and code phrase the right to vote as a grant. See WIS. CONST.
art. III, § 1; WIS. STAT. § 6.02 (2017), http://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/statutes/statutes/6/I/02.
Wisconsin’s constitution also grants municipalities broad home rule power. See WIS. CONST. art.
XI, § 3.
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Wyoming X378 X379
378 Wyoming’s constitution and code phrase the right to vote as a grant (except for felons
and those “adjudicated to be mentally incompetent”). See WYO. CONST. art. VI, §§ 2, 6; WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 22-1-102(xxvi) (2017) (Wyoming’s online code does not allow for direct links to
individual provisions, but the full code is available at http://legisweb.state.wy.us/NXT/gateway.dll
?f=templates&fn=default.htm). But with regard to home rule, Wyoming’s election code provides
that the state’s election rules also govern municipal elections, thereby limiting municipal voting
laws. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-2-101, 22-23-101 (2017).
379 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-7-317 (2017).
